

SOCIAL RESEARCH

AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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January 1955

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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES*

BY ALFRED JUNZ

ALTHOUGH conversation today is not so entirely dominated by political issues as it was in Bagehot's time, it remains one of the functions of a representative assembly to educate the public and provide the subjects of conversation. How often the issues discussed in the Congress of the United States overtake the activities of the sports world as the subject of general public conversation, no one can say with authority. But it is a fact that from time to time a particular officer or department of the government becomes the object of a general public scrutiny. It is usually a supposed failure or malfeasance that brings public intelligence to ask pertinent questions. On occasion, if the interest is intense and long-lasting enough, answers may be arrived at.

Today in the United States that occasionally aroused interest is high enough to lead us to believe that answers may be forthcoming. The subject of interest is the role and conduct of congressional investigating committees.

I

Public inquiry in this country has almost always taken the form of activity by an appropriate—or enterprising—congressional committee. It is a much noted truth that once the direction of the crowd is discernible, the legislators try to place themselves at its fore, as its leaders. It is merely the logical consequence of this that currently the role and functions of congressional investigating committees are being studied by a congressional committee. This is no sarcasm, but a simple recognition that in the final analysis

* EDITORS' NOTE—This article received the Doris E. Fleischman Award of the Edward L. Bernays Foundation in a competition judged by the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, June 1, 1954.

American legislators determine their own competence within constitutional limits. It is enough for the people to determine the legislators.

True, the real limits of the powers of the members of the Congress lie in the positive political morality of the nation. Yet the legislators, although only one step removed from the sovereign populace, constitute the department of government which—if the compromises by which our constitutional government operates were suspended—could assume practical supremacy over all other departments. This is not clearly seen by the people, whose imagination has been captured by the presidency, despite the fact that charismatic leadership is virtually unknown to the office. It is not that the president is less important than is generally supposed, but that the Congress is more important.

There is no major case book in American constitutional law that does not present the administrative powers of the president as being on a par with his enumerated political and military powers. But the constitution, in dealing with administration, charges the executive only with seeing that the laws are faithfully executed. No unequivocal provision for control of the administration was made, in favor of either president or Congress.

In present practice, as a result of a modern tendency to confer administrative authority in the chief executive,¹ the balance of administrative control lies with the president. The American executive—federal as well as state—is characterized at present by a willingness to accept administrative authority. It must be recognized, however, that originally the president was not viewed as the administrative head of government, with general powers of directing and controlling the acts of subordinate agents.² From the outset the Congress had the power to regulate the departments of the administration, and therefore had a right to learn the details of their needs and conduct. It is the Congress that determines the

¹ See W. F. Willoughby, *Principles of Public Administration* (Baltimore 1927) Chapter 3.

² See *The Federalist*, Numbers 69, 70, and 72.

subjects of interest to the administration, the instrumentalities for undertaking the necessary activities, the lifetime, the size of the personnel, and the powers and rules of procedure of all federal administrative agencies, the monies available, and the means of control. Investigating committees are the most important means of control.

Advised by Bagehot of the anger men feel when the pain of a new idea is forced upon them, I hasten to say that the idea I have just expressed is not at all new, but seems only to have passed out of public consciousness during the course of the last quarter-century.

Nearly a century ago John Stuart Mill made a pertinent observation in his *Representative Government* (Chapter 5):

Instead of the function of governing for which it is radically unfit, the proper office of a representative assembly is to watch and control the government: to throw the light of publicity on its acts; to compel a full exposition and justification of all of them which any one considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulfill it in a manner which conflicts with the deliberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually appoint their successors. This is surely ample power, and security enough for the liberty of the nation.

In 1885, about a score of years later, Woodrow Wilson in his *Congressional Government* (Chapter 5) concurred in this opinion:

No one, I take it for granted, is disposed to disallow the principle that the representatives of the people are the proper ultimate authority in all matters of government, and that administration is merely the clerical part of government. Legislation is the originating force . . . The power of making laws is in its very nature and essence the power of directing, and that power is given to Congress. The principle is without drawback, and is inseparably of a piece with all Anglo-Saxon usage; the difficulty, if there be any, must lie in the choice of means whereby to energize the principle . . . Congress cannot control the offices of the executive

without disgracing them. Its only whip is investigation, semi-judicial examination into corners suspected to be dirty . . . Power and strict accountability for its use are the essential constituents of good government . . . from the necessity of the case the President cannot often be really supreme in matters of administration . . . [he] is no greater than his prerogative of veto makes him; he is in other words powerful rather as a branch of the legislature than as the titular head of the executive.

The American choice was between creating one ruling committee, like a British cabinet, and distributing business among a number of committees. The choice of the second alternative had, to recommend it, a useful division of labor and an element of republican equality. The congressional-committee system arises from two features that distinguish the American Congress from the British Parliament: first, the permanent exclusion of the executive from the legislative body; and second, the absence of a stable majority in support of the president. These two features make it impossible for there to be an automatic control of the business of the legislature, such as is essential to the system of cabinet government.

Legislative committees—clothed with the powers necessary for investigation and charged with making the accountability of all the branches of administration meaningful and real—are more numerous and more frequently resorted to in the United States than in most other countries, and their activities are of greater breadth. Only in the United States are investigations regarded as instrumentalities of first-rate importance and of practically indispensable utility.³ The sociological features that account for this fact include the size of the nation, the diversity of the interests of the people, and the economic and social control assumed by government. But the separation of the powers and functions of the legislative and executive departments of government is the basic institutional fact that makes the congressional investigating

³ See Marshall Dimock, *Congressional Investigating Committees*, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, series 47, no. 1 (Baltimore 1929).

committee a necessitous instrument to effect the accountability of the administration to the legislature.⁴

It is possible that something like the present committee system would have developed even without this overwhelming necessity. But it is this necessity that keeps the committee system in being and powerful. If the formal powers of the committees are limited, their real powers are very great. In all free states the lawmaking bodies, primary or representative, have sought to make the executive subject to themselves. The question is whether the danger of abuses by the instrument of legislative control—and in every moment the actual harm done—is so clear and substantial as to make it advisable that free congressional inquiry should be limited.

II

The modern era of legislative commissions of inquiry was historically preceded by the era of the judicial function of the British House of Commons—which in turn is traceable to the time of the Magnum Concilium. It would go too far to look to those earlier institutions for the origin of the American congressional power of inquiry.⁵ Nevertheless, even if the heritage is denied, the experience cannot be. The privileges and powers of committees of inquiry were assumed by the representative assemblies of the thirteen colonies, and were adopted without question despite the governors' vetoes and imperial disallowance. As early as 1722 the Massachusetts House of Representatives investigated and subpoenaed the executive officers responsible for the failure of military operations against the Indians, claiming not only "... their privilege but duty to demand of any officer in the pay and service of this government an account of his management while in the public employ."⁶

Colonial courts and legislatures possessed summary powers to

⁴ See William Bondy, *The Separation of Governmental Powers, in History, in Theory, and in the Constitutions* (New York 1896) Chapter 2.

⁵ Note the Chapman case, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).

⁶ Quoted in Dimock, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

cope with offenses to decorum as well as to punish witnesses for contempt. The source of the power was recognized in the necessity for self-help and self-defense. It was an efficient instrument to protect the institutions of government from unwarranted interferences with their work. With both the courts and the legislatures the exercise of such power was not the primary purpose of their creation, but subsidiary to the effectuation of that purpose. This necessity was given general recognition. In 1789 the legislative process everywhere in the constituent states included the use of investigating committees with powers to send for persons and papers, and to punish contempts. From its inception the Congress held to a broad view of its inquisitorial powers, and by degrees it built precedents establishing its authority to conduct compulsory investigations.

This then was the genesis of congressional investigatory powers. Accepted on the basis of two centuries of usage in Anglo-Saxon legislatures, these powers were exercised without augmentation for more than a century before their pivotal role in the operation of government was challenged. The challenge came only three decades ago; it was misdirected and failed.⁷ But why should a challenge have arisen at all—and why should we be witnessing a new and more vigorous challenge today?

If we concentrate on a concise statement of the powers of legislative inquiry, rather than dealing with a chronology of events and an evaluation of personalities, we can cut away much that has obstructed proper perspective in dealing with these questions.⁸ What are the powers of legislative inquiry? Briefly these:

Each house of Congress, in addition to its enumerated powers, has the implied power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of papers and information—enforce-

⁷ See Felix Frankfurter, "Hands Off the Investigations," in *New Republic*, vol. 38 (May 21, 1924) p. 329.

⁸ The best analysis of the theory underlying the role of committees of inquiry is George B. Galloway's "The Investigative Function of Congress," in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 21 (February 1927) pp. 58-70; its observations are as pertinent to the situation today as they were to that of 1923-24.

able by the power to punish for contempt—in the course of any investigation proceeding within its jurisdiction. While no such power is implied in aid of an investigation outside that jurisdiction,⁹ a presumption of validity attaches itself to a resolution of either house of Congress, as it does to the legislation of both houses. It is in this way in particular that investigations of public officers or departments are legislative in purpose—and therefore valid—until the contrary is shown.¹⁰ Congressional investigation is construed to be no usurpation of a purely juridical function, but merely a quasi-judicial activity used in the exercise of a legislative function—since the Congress may employ any means it deems necessary and proper for the execution of its lawmaking powers.¹¹

The power to punish for contempt cannot be limited to the few strictly judicial functions of the Congress (that is, impeachment and trial). Such a limitation would leave the Congress during its normal work incapable of punishing misconduct in its presence. There are no judicial decisions so limiting it, and there are at least two decisions that oppose such a limitation.¹² Either house may punish for contempt persons who refuse to supply information and answer questions pertinent to the subject matter of the inquiry, so long as such compliance would not imply self-incrimination. But the Congress is not the final judge of its own powers and privileges when the private rights and liberties of a citizen are at issue. This is the province of courts of competent jurisdiction.

Care has been taken above to say that congressional investigatory powers have been exercised without augmentation throughout the life of this republic. What we have witnessed is merely the extension of those powers that had been claimed before into

⁹ See *Marshall v. Gordon*, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).

¹⁰ See *McGrain v. Daugherty*, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).

¹¹ Joseph Story, in his *Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States* (Boston 1833) vol. 3, sect. 118, was among the first to ask where, if Congress may employ any means necessary to the execution of its functions, are the limits?

¹² *Anderson v. Dunn*, 6 Wheat. 204 (1821), and *Marshall v. Gordon*, 243 U.S. 521 (1917).

areas that closely border on the constitutional position of the officers of the government, and on the guarantees of individual rights to the people living under that government.

The Congress sought to aid each of the houses in the discharge of its constitutional powers and functions by the passage of the act of 1857, designed to enforce the attendance of witnesses before committees of inquiry, and to compel their testimony. Enforcement of the statutory punishment of witnesses held in contempt of either house of Congress was transferred to the courts. The act of 1857 granted immunity with regard to those facts testified to before the houses or committees of Congress. The result was that many persons evaded criminal liability by presenting themselves to congressional committees and placing their actions, through testimony, above the jurisdiction of the courts. After only five years the unqualified immunity was replaced by a "limited immunity." Criminal acts were thenceforth to remain punishable at the courts, and only the actual testimony given before a committee of Congress was placed beyond use in court as evidence. It has remained a matter of controversy whether or not this modification denied witnesses the privilege against self-incrimination as granted in the Fifth Amendment.

This area of doubt, remaining unresolved, has resulted in a return by witnesses to the pre-1857 practice of refusing testimony upon reference to their privileges under the Fifth Amendment. Current proposals to grant immunity to witnesses before investigation committees would be a return to the full immunity granted by the statute of 1857. Whatever the fate of these proposals will be, it is noteworthy that after almost a century of debate as to the relative importance of the congressional committees' need for information and the individual's need for protection from self-incrimination, the balance appears, to at least two analysts,¹³ to favor the investigatory power of the Congress.

¹³ Henry Ehrmann, "The Duty of Disclosure in Parliamentary Investigation," in *University of Chicago Law Review*, vol. 11, no. 1 (December 1943), and vol. 11, no. 2 (February 1944); and R. K. Carr, *The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945-1950* (Ithaca 1952).

It cannot be argued that the acts of 1857 and 1862 were augmentations of the investigatory powers of the houses of Congress. Even these statutes did not make the investigatory powers any greater. They only made the exercise more effective.

The conflict between the needs of the Congress and the guaranteed liberties of individuals, important as it is—and there is no intent here to deny this importance, on which some remarks will be made later—does not go to the heart of the function of the investigating committee in the American governmental system. The investigating committee—clothed with the powers necessary to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses—exists to fill a need. The most important facet of that need is the control of public administration. Why that particular need arose, and whether or not it is a continuing need of our form of government, is the immediate concern of the following remarks.

III

The necessitous role of the congressional investigating committee, in a governmental system based on a separation of executive and legislative powers, can perhaps be pointed up a little more sharply by a brief examination of a governmental system wherein these powers are not separated. The British parliamentary system offers such an example. Based on the principle of ministerial responsibility to the Commons, that system has obviated investigating committees as we know them, in the following ways.

In the first place, a strictly judicial means of deciding disputes about legislative membership—electoral disputes or others—has rendered unnecessary this function of the American investigating committees, with its attendant danger of party considerations. The judiciary involved is so appointed that neither the legislature nor the executive can influence its decision.

Second, the legislative function of the American investigating committees has been fulfilled in Britain by the institution of Royal Commissions, appointed by the executive in accordance with the expressed interests of the Commons. These commissions, com-

posed of experts and scientists, have an authority that extends beyond the parliamentary session, and their longer tenure allows for greater depth of inquiry than is the case in American congressional inquiries. They are generally free from political bias, and they permit the legislators to proceed with their other work.¹⁴

Third, the function of keeping the executive accountable to the legislature is carried out in Britain through two technical devices. Back of both is the ultimate responsibility of the government to a majority of the Commons. One of these devices is the system of "grievance before supply," which places upon every department the responsibility for explaining its policies and operations before the monies to carry on its work are appropriated; one of the formulae used to enforce a full exposition of administrative details is a "proposed reduction in the salary of the minister responsible." The other such technical device is the "Question Hour," one of the chief excellencies of the British Parliament. It is a designated time set aside every week for questions to be put to the responsible ministers by the members of the Commons, and it constitutes a first line of attack and cross-examination of executive policies and administration. Failure on the part of the executive to give in the Commons, during the Question Hour, a good or satisfactory account of its activities can result in a movement for adjournment on a matter of urgent public business—in effect a motion of censure on the executive.

It was noted above that the experience and the practice of colonial legislatures inspired the theory that underlies the present-day investigatory power of Congress. Since freedom was a gift that had to be won by resistance to arbitrary monarchs, executive power was deemed dangerous to freedom. It was viewed with suspicion, and limited by legal restraints. When the power of the people had been established beyond question, the suspicion gradually subsided. But the legal restraints remained.

¹⁴ The wide use of the "Royal Commission" device by the American executive and its potential for the future are analyzed by M. Nelson McGeary, *The Developments of Congressional Investigative Power*, Columbia University Studies in History and Public Law, no. 465 (New York 1940) pp. 128-40.

Written into the constitution—despite all disclaimers¹⁵—remained the principle of the separation of powers. This is not an absolute separation; the president's participation in the legislative process, through his veto power, has already been noted. But in contrast to Britain, where there is a separation of powers functionally and a union of powers personally in the members of Parliament and the executive, there is in the United States a union of powers functionally and a separation of powers personally.¹⁶ The superiority of the parliamentary to the congressional system has often been claimed. Certainly the American separation of powers tends to make the control of the executive sporadic and relatively difficult, if not always inefficient. But the congressional inquiry, as an American substitute for the devices of parliamentary systems, has developed as an important factor in the legislative supervision of the administration of government.

Congress, through its investigations, assumes to some extent the functions of a grand jury. This is especially evident in the role played by House investigating committees prior to the preferment of impeachment proceedings. Impeachment as a measure of control over the officers of government is a wholly inadequate instrument. It can operate only on the most serious charges, its procedure is slow, and it leaves many loopholes for escape. Most of the inquiries of congressional investigating committees do not deal with abuses that would warrant preferment of impeachment. Their legitimate purpose is legislation or control, not punishment.

The record of congressional investigations of the executive branch has been a successful one. The first exercise of investigatory power involved the secretaries of war and the treasury. Successive inquiries extended—over the objections of the president—as far as the conduct of the clerical personnel in the executive departments. Government officials have almost always responded

¹⁵ See Woodrow Wilson, *The President of the United States* (New York 1916).

¹⁶ See W. F. Willoughby, *Principles of Legislative Organization and Administration* (Washington 1934) Chapter 1; Willoughby speaks of organic rather than functional separation or union.

in good faith to the subpoenas of the investigating committees. Generally the committees have addressed themselves to the heads of departments, but in the sweeping course of their investigations they have often called other officials before them, without objection by the responsible officer.¹⁷

The number of disputes precipitated by objections of the executive have been relatively few as compared with the total number of investigations initiated. Executives reluctant to honor the requests of congressional investigating committees have often taken the position that their refusal was necessary in order to uphold a strict constructionist view of the separation of powers. There are many instances in which the disputes have led to strongly worded congressional denunciations of recalcitrant officials, and even to proposals for their arrest and detention, but no contempt action has ever been taken against a member of the executive department.¹⁸

A number of requests by responsible secretaries and officers of the executive have initiated congressional investigations into their own departments and policies. The president himself has been the central subject of congressional investigations some thirty times in our history. On one occasion the president requested such an investigation. More often he has resisted the activities

¹⁷ The best available studies of congressional inquiries are Dimock's detailed historical survey (cited above, note 3); Ernest J. Eberling, *Congressional Investigations*, Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, no. 307 (New York 1928); and McGeary (cited above, note 14).

¹⁸ The strongest action directed against an executive officer was the vote of the Senate in 1924 calling for the resignation of Secretary Denby, an action more characteristic of a parliamentary than of a congressional system. Two evaluations of the 1923-24 investigation may be noted. Galloway (cited above, note 8) pp. 63-64: "In 1924 the people were first dismayed, then bewildered, and finally bored. The way the inquiries were conducted, the type of witnesses heard, the kind of evidence accepted at face value, the ignorant questions of committee members and the apparent party bias of the investigators prompted the public to discount the full significance of the disclosures." And Lindsay Rogers, *The American Senate* (New York 1926) p. 207: "What the 1924 investigations disclosed is not pertinent here, nor is it necessary to discuss the attitude that the press and the country took toward them. It is sufficient to remark that three out of ten Cabinet members were permitted or pressed to resign, that there were several indictments and two suicides."

of the congressional investigating committees, objecting to the purpose, the scope, or the procedures.

In the course of the hundreds of investigations that the Congress has instituted into the conduct of the administration, it appears that a balance has somehow been struck between the needs of legislative control and the maintenance of administrative efficiency—the latter often equated largely with the need for secrecy. But the balance is an unstable one. The Congress has frequently cloaked its requests with the conditional clause “if the public security permits,” in order to allow for the operation of executive discretion, but it seems that the Congress, by a mysterious force within itself, is ever again driven to encroach upon the executive. The executive, so far, has resolutely resisted.

In summing up the experience of history it can be said that encroachment by the legislature on the executive is as certain to be attempted as the contrary. If the executive wins, government, though bad, remains at least possible; if the legislature wins, government becomes impossible. The American legislature, trained in the tradition of negative government, is not capable of positive leadership. The strong leadership that the United States needs in order to attain strong government can be provided only by the president.¹⁹ The right balance is hard to strike. In the words of Galloway (pp. 65–66): “. . . the hope of breaking for once and for all the vicious circle from despotism to republicanism and back again which has been the experience of political history, lies in a constitutional arrangement enabling the legislative authority to control the executive without impairing the force and celerity of its action.” The congressional investigating committee has proved itself an essential part of that arrangement.

The apparent reluctance on the part of either branch of government to press its claims before the judiciary has resulted in a series of compromises. The balance as actually achieved appears

¹⁹ H. J. Laski, in *The American Presidency* (New York 1940) pp. 243 and passim, discusses the alternatives of congressional and executive attempts to supply the nation with leadership. See also G. R. Brown, *The Leadership of Congress* (Indianapolis 1922).

remarkably enough, not unlike that viewed by the founding fathers as essential to good government; although unstable, it does not appear unhealthy.

IV

Whatever our judgment may be regarding the utility of congressional investigating committees, their position as legitimate organs of the governmental system is established in the law of the nation.²⁰ The right of Congress to appoint such committees, while not provided for in the specific provisions of the constitution, rests firmly on the doctrine of implied powers as laid down in *McCulloch v. Maryland*.²¹ In that case Chief Justice Marshall said:

. . . it may with great reason be contended, that a government, intrusted with such ample powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so vitally depends, must also be intrusted with ample means for their execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and embarrass its execution, by withholding the most appropriate means . . . Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.

In order to prove the validity of an implied power, an expressed power of the Congress must be cited. There is no problem here with regard to investigations undertaken by Congress to judge the legitimacy of elections, and very little with regard to the legislative function. It is with regard to the control function claimed by the Congress that the power has proved most debatable. But reason dictates that an instrument to investigate the departments of government which the Congress has established, and for which it is asked to appropriate funds, is among those means that are necessary and proper for carrying its powers into execution.

²⁰ See Eberling (cited above, note 17) Chapters 5 and 6.

²¹ 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).

The courts have not contributed to clarifying the position that investigatory bodies of the Congress hold in the exercise of its control of executive departments. The question was available to the courts in the 1927 case of *McGrain v. Daugherty*, already cited, but there it was circumvented by the dictum that the investigation in question was a legal one in pursuance of the legislative function of Congress. This was the first time that the use of investigatory committees in this way was given sanction by the courts.

The failure of the courts to pass explicitly on the question how far the Congress can go in demanding information of executive officers is largely due to the fact that so few conflicts have reached their jurisdiction. In line with their traditional attitude, the courts have been reluctant to go further than was necessary to decide the case at hand.

Between constitutional law, which is the ultimate basis of the investigatory powers of the Congress, and adjudication by the courts, which is the final test of those powers in conflicts with individuals appearing before investigating committees, lies the area of what can be called "resolution law." In each house of Congress the resolutions of inquiry determine the scope and powers of the investigation committees. These resolutions could, if desired, regulate also the procedural methods by which the committees operate, but they have not done so. The Congress seems to have believed that its resolutions of inquiry can meet the need for effective instruments of inquiry only by broad delegations of authority.

In point of fact, the Congress can never know in advance the precise limits to which its committees' interrogations may lead it. To "hamstring" a committee by resolutions of limited purpose and powers might therefore defeat the ultimate purpose of the investigating device. Within the broad limits of their enumerated, implied, and inherent powers the houses of the Congress, and in turn their committees, determine their own competence. And Congress is responsible only to the people.

It is true that the lack of close regulations regarding the procedural methods of the committees of Congress is accountable for the occurrence of a number of abuses that might otherwise never have happened. It is also true that these abuses of procedure constitute a threat to the personal guarantees of individuals, by exposing them to defamation of character and name. The liberty of the nation, to be made secure from the powers of the government, must be respected in every individual. Therefore it is almost everywhere argued that an approximation of the guarantees accorded to individuals in courts of law is the necessary remedy. The writer cannot agree.

The decisions of the committees themselves, of the two houses of Congress, and of the courts have been uniformly consistent in declaring that investigating committees are not bound to follow the principles and precedents of courts of law in conducting investigations. Underlying this has been the expressed opinion that investigations are not trials, but aids in the pursuance of a function of the legislative body. If investigations are put on the same strict basis as actions in courts of law, their purpose will be defeated.

The most denounced committee of this day, in its rules of procedure, guarantees individuals appearing before it, in open or in closed session, the right to counsel, and also the right, with the consent of a majority of the committee, to submit questions for the cross-examination of other witnesses. But even the least sophisticated among us recognize that the practical value of these guarantees depends on the good faith of the members of the committee. The answer to this, according to most fighters for fair play in congressional investigations, is to establish the rights to counsel and cross-examination, among others, in a fundamental law of procedure, above the discretion of the committee.

It is true that in the spring of 1954 we saw the right to cross-examination bring to a standstill Senate hearings on the conflicting charges made by a member of that body and by a member of the executive branch of government; this failure is attributed, by

those who support the right of cross-examination in congressional inquiries, to the chairman's inability to control the proceedings. But we also witnessed, only a few years ago, the mockery that was made of the right to cross-examination in a court of law, during a trial of a group of conspirators, although an exceptionally strong and capable jurist was on the bench. The introduction of an absolute right of cross-examination would destroy the efficiency of committees of inquiry; a limited right of cross-examination would be subject to the same abuses that are complained of at present.²²

In the final analysis the members of investigating committees, unless hamstrung by strict inhibitions, will conduct their activities and exercise their powers to the fullest extent compatible with what they recognize as the positive political morality of the nation. The American people have found that the spectacle of a single legislator sitting as an investigating committee in closed session, acting as judge, jury, prosecutor, and court reporter all in one, can vanish as quickly as did the kangaroo court in Alice's underground adventure. The people, in the spirit of Alice, have only to shout "You are nothing but a Senator, who cares for you?" That is, they have only to exert their morality against that of members of the legislature.²³

Indeed, the danger that now presents itself is that a reaction to potential or relatively minor abuses, magnified out of proportion, will be carried too far and result in the institution of artificial devices to limit free congressional inquiry. The remedy could then be worse than the disease.

A final word is needed on the political aspect of congressional

²² In his 1924 article (cited above, note 7) Felix Frankfurter, one of the most judicious of writers, defends congressional investigations against artificial limitations of free inquiry, but insists upon the right to cross-examination of other witnesses by parties represented by counsel before committees of inquiry.

²³ In *McGrain v. Daugherty* (cited above, note 10) there is a line (October Term 1926, p. 156) which reads "The committee was part of the Senate, and its members were acting under their oath as senators." In the New York Public Library copy of this volume of the reports, someone has penciled in the marginal notation "Baloney." The presumption, if not binding, is understandable.

investigating committees. Even though these committees fulfill a need in a governmental system based on a separation of powers, the fact remains that the power of investigation is also an important tool in the party strife and the struggle for personal power. Therefore it is in each house a privilege to be bartered for, but particularly in the Senate; there, because closure cannot be invoked, resolutions of inquiry have a good chance of success. Each political party knows the necessity of completing a constructive legislative program. The minority knows too that the administration leaders, rather than be thwarted by a filibuster, will allow a resolution of inquiry to be approved by the Rules Committee—particularly as the session draws to an end.

This may seem to suggest that the filibuster is the ultimate safeguard against a majority despotism; it may be argued that closure can block the possibility of enforcing accountability in high places, and that the expedient of filibuster must be available if public investigations are to remain a feature of our governmental system. Those who support investigations may well prefer another basis for the power of such inquiries.

There are probably some who would do away with both these features of our system. But such tidiness as that would be shortsighted. We must remember with Bagehot that the "dignified aspect of [a legislature] is altogether secondary to its efficient use."

THE PROCESS OF BALANCED ECONOMIC GROWTH

BY LORETO M. DOMINGUEZ
AND HAROLD PILVIN *

THE object of this paper is to fill in a few of the lacunae in our comprehension of the complex process of economic growth, by analyzing income expansion in terms of growth of the various industries making up the economy. Some of the factors determining this expansion are investigated, and the requirements for a sustained income increase are analyzed from the standpoint of the growth of the constituent industries.

I

We may begin by postulating a closed economy comprising n industries. The industries produce final, intermediate, capital, and primary goods. Time sequence is measured by periods of a "year." "Growth" is defined as an increase in aggregate real income. We assume a given set of relative prices in the current (reference) year, and also assume that in the same year there is a condition of price equilibrium in all markets (no excess demands or supplies).

As a first step, and in order to throw light on the requirements for sustained growth, we shall concentrate attention on one of the industries whose product is a final consumption good. Suppose that entrepreneurs in the industry decide to produce and offer for sale next year x percent more product than this year. Let us assume that the necessary additional labor and other resources are obtainable, that the additional plant capacity already

* The authors, economists with the Pan American Union, Washington, D. C., wish to mention that the views here expressed do not necessarily represent the views of that organization. An earlier draft of the present article was completed and distributed in mimeographed form in March 1953.

exists, and, further, that the added product is forthcoming at no change in unit cost. The expanding industry will then distribute to the productive factors employed by it income shares that in the aggregate could make possible the profitable sale of the additional output. But the industry's own factors will of course direct their additional income only in part upon this industry's product. Under what conditions is it certain that this additional output will be sold without a decline in profits?

The proximate condition is that total demand for the product, at this period's price, increase by at least x percent (or, if less, by at least enough that the effect on profits of the fall in market price is offset by the sales increase; the greater the price elasticity of demand in the relevant range, the less likelihood there will be of a profits decline). Under our assumptions, this increase in demand requires in turn that (disposable) national income next year increase by an amount such that demand for the product, given its income elasticity, rises by the requisite x percent or more. But this increase in income will be forthcoming only if other industries have also and simultaneously expanded production, by amounts such that factor income payments have risen, in the aggregate, by the necessary percentage.

We may distinguish three cases, according to whether aggregate income rises by an amount equal to, less than, or greater than the necessary percentage. In the event of an equal rise the expectations of the industry's producers (clearly not each of them, but in an aggregate or average sense) are realized, and their resulting optimism, other things being equal, will incline them to contemplate a further expansion. But in the event of a less than equal rise, demand for the product falls short of supply, price falls, and total profits may decline. If there is a decline in profits, entrepreneurs, in planning for the succeeding period, may think in terms of either a contraction of production or, at best, no further expansion. In either instance, their experience will tend to operate as a brake on the growth rate. Finally, in the event

of a more than equal rise, expectations have been more than realized, and the prevailing atmosphere will be one of buoyant optimism. The increasing profits associated with the sale of the year's output will act as a strong stimulus to a further expansion, and hence provide a stimulus to growth.

Thus the extent of the individual industry's ability to expand successfully—that is, the extent to which its entrepreneurs, when they attempt to expand, succeed in increasing or at least maintaining profits—is dependent in the first instance on the concurrent overall rate of growth. It is this aggregate growth which determines the increment in demand for the industry's product in the succeeding period, and hence its profit experience in that period. This increment in demand is, in general, due only in small part to the expansion of the industry. The individual industry can do little to provide this *sine qua non* necessary for its expansion. There are, at any given time, definite limits to the growth of any one industry. An excessive expansion by a single industry—excessive in comparison with the expansion of aggregate income for the economy as a whole and the income elasticity of demand for the industry's product—will result in declining profits or even in net losses. Thus the total level of economic activity, including the general psychological atmosphere prevailing in the business community, operates as a constraint upon the individual industry. Optimism on the part of entrepreneurs in any one industry, in the face of a general unwillingness to expand, will quickly force the expansionist industry into line. On the other hand, individual pessimism and unwillingness to expand during a period of widespread optimism will not last for long. The hesitant entrepreneurs will not long be blind to their rising profits, or to the increasing share of the market falling to competitors.

We may generalize the above argument concerning the single consumer-goods industry. What has been said regarding any one such industry applies to them all. The success in disposing of the additional output at a profit satisfactory to entrepreneurs

depends on the extent to which they have increased supply, in relation to the total income change determined by the output of all industries in the economy. The expansion of the various consumer-goods industries will thus be limited, or conditioned, by the demand pattern which evolves as growth of income takes place, and which is the result, *ceteris paribus*, of the income growth. This fact of income-induced demand-pattern changes is one reason why growth must be "balanced," and gives a clue to the nature of the balance required if growth is to be sustained.

Any given growth in total real income may be obtained by various percentage increases in the production of the several industries. A 10 percent increase in total product may come about, for example, through a 15 percent expansion in industries constituting one-half the productive capacity and a 5 percent expansion by the rest, or through a 10 percent expansion by all, or through any other distribution that adds up to the same 10 percent aggregate increase. But although the same increase of product and factor payments may come about in any one of many possible ways, the incremental demand pattern will exhibit much less diversity. As a consequence, numerous industries may have overexpanded, while others may have fallen short of producing enough to satisfy demand. If misjudgments of demand are not great, the expansion may continue with little friction; the price system will act to direct resources into industries in accordance with evolving demand.

If there are substantial overestimations of demand, however, the affected entrepreneurs may react in such a way as to affect adversely the overall rate of growth. By cutting down their rates of expansion they may significantly reduce the rate of increase in income payments (and effective demand) in the aggregate, retarding thereby the future rates of demand growth and expansion open to the various industries. If the industries thus affected produce important percentages of total final product, the unfavorable experience of entrepreneurs may have a depressing psychological effect on entrepreneurs in other final-product industries, as well

as a retardation effect on supplying industries via derived demands.¹

The affected industries will release resources, and thus contribute to unemployment. But there will be other industries bidding for these resources. In the case of resources that are readily transferable, the effects of this readjustment process may be quite mild. Where the resource concerned is relatively fixed, as in the case of heavy plant or equipment, it may be difficult or impossible to effectuate the transfer; there may thus eventuate a waste of real resources, as a result of transfer time lags, or total non-transferability.

In an advanced industrial economy, such waste may be considerable in absolute magnitude, though quite small percentage-wise and hence relatively unimportant and virtually unnoticed from the social viewpoint. Matters may be quite different, however, in the case of other economies, for example, a newly industrializing one. In this important category of cases, where capital or other resources of vital importance to development may be very scarce, such errors of judgment may have a serious retarding influence, through adverse effects on the attitudes and actions of individuals who are economic agents of importance. Where a concerted or planned national effort is being made to bring about rapid and substantial growth, relatively large resource movements may be taking place within a relatively short period, and the psychological—as well as the direct economic—effects of such miscalculations upon further growth may be relatively quite serious.

From an aggregate, or macroeconomic, viewpoint we have two possible situations. One is that in every industry the new level of demand equals the new level of supply at the existing price; for each industry, planned demand equals planned supply. Aggregate planned demand and supply are equal. No price change

¹ For remarks in a vein similar in some respects to the preceding paragraphs, see Hans Neisser's "Critical Notes on the Acceleration Principle," in *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (May 1954) pp. 271-72, which appeared after this article had been accepted for publication.

takes place in any market, and the general price level is necessarily unchanged. Aggregative equilibrium prevails precisely because it prevails in every market.

Typically, however, we know that in some markets excess demands and supplies will prevail. Then in the individual markets prices will alter. Conceivably, the general price level, a statistical composite, will show no change, or only insignificant change, despite a possibly considerable discrepancy between the planned demands and supplies. Thus even where the general price level does not change materially in the next period (excess demands canceling out excess supplies), apparently signifying equilibrium, there is in fact potential disequilibrium, because some excess (both positive and negative) demand situations may have repercussions on entrepreneurial behavior, employment, and income.

II

In order to consider certain further implications of the foregoing, we shall now abandon one of our assumptions—that each industry already possesses the excess capacity needed to expand output for sale in the period in which demand has increased. Let us assume, instead, a condition of full employment. Then if demand at constant prices for the product of a given industry increases by $\$x$, and the marginal investment-output ratio is a , the investment required for the preservation of equilibrium is $\$ax$. The required expansion of capacity may be forthcoming if firms in the industry can obtain the needed savings. In addition, the expansion of capacity beyond some point in general presupposes the availability of other cooperating resources such as labor (or technological changes that make possible increased productivity of resources already in the industry, altering the production function). For any one industry the additional labor (and other resources) may be forthcoming without an increase in the total labor force, but for the whole economy expansion requires that labor force growth (or a shift in production functions) be taking place.

We may expect that, where growth is gradual and does not proceed by sharp increments, the price-profit system will tend to direct investment into the appropriate channels with a minimum of dislocation and friction. Again, however, where the growth is rapid or newly undertaken, savings may not be channeled in direction and amount into the industries indicated by emergent demand patterns, and therefore large excess demands and supplies in the individual markets may result.

A dynamic equality similar to that in regard to final consumption goods must prevail in the case of the derived raw-materials demand and the composition of supplies of these materials. If the rate of supply increase fails by a considerable margin to conform to the rates of increase of demand, growth will be retarded. The country's endowment of resources and the elasticity of supplies of these resources are fundamental in determining ability to grow. Whether or not real output can be expanded readily along the lines indicated by dynamic consumer demands hinges on whether resource availabilities are such as to permit capacity to grow. Unless the supply elasticities of the resources essential to satisfying the growing demands are relatively high, a high rate of growth will be difficult to achieve.

For any given state of technological knowledge, supply elasticities of finished commodities are determined in part by the availability of primary commodities which the productive system elaborates into finished consumer and capital goods. The greater and more varied the natural-resource base, the easier will be the process of expanding the output of finished goods. The narrower the base, the greater the difficulties that will be met, up to the point where growth will be totally inhibited because of the appearance of supply elasticities equal to zero.

The conditions required by the seemingly appalling problem of balance described above could be fulfilled if the supply schedules of every commodity and productive service might be assumed to be infinitely elastic. Unhappily this is not so. The output of some commodities will expand rapidly under the stimuli of

increasing demands and slightly higher prices; that of others very slowly, and only under the inducement of much higher prices; finally, the elasticity of supply of some commodities may be zero, or nearly so. A very inelastic supply schedule for a commodity for which there is no adequate substitute (say a raw material or service) may have the effect of reducing the rate of expansion of many other commodities—including joint inputs the supply schedules of which may be more elastic—to a lower rate determined by the one in relatively inelastic supply. It follows that a closed economy would face difficulties in attaining an output composed of the ingredients necessary to make growth a relatively smooth—or even feasible—process, unless it happened to be confronted with fairly elastic supply schedules for every component of its output; or unless supply schedules were falling under the impact of technological change.

The implications of the possible disparities between the income elasticities of demand for some commodities—or categories of commodities—and the *respective* supply elasticities are of the utmost importance for economic growth. The rate of growth attainable with a given volume of capital investment under given conditions of technological knowledge must depend on the relationship between the supply and demand elasticities of each commodity. Growth will be easier if all supply elasticities are high, or at least if elasticities of supplies are high for the commodities with high income elasticities of demand. High income elasticities coupled with low supply elasticities will slow down the rate of growth and increase the capital requirements per unit of additional output. Indivisibilities and inelasticities in commodity supplies—due either to inelastic (or discontinuous) supply curves of factors or to the character of the technical processes—may lead to unavoidable demand-supply discrepancies in some markets. In consequence of these limitations on the supply side, perfect smoothness in growth cannot be expected even if entrepreneurial expectations regarding changing consumer demands are realized. It will rarely be possible to avoid the occurrence

of some substantial demand-supply discrepancies in the various markets.

The inherently uneven character of growth is emphasized further when we take a less simplified view of dynamic demand patterns. Until now we have supposed that commodity demands change solely in response to income; and we have found, despite this simplifying assumption, that the process of growth—even within our very limited framework of discussion—is complex and fraught with potential frictions and obstacles. Growth will, however, be accompanied by the emergence of new tastes, opening up the possibilities of, and the problems attending, diversion of resources into new industries and invasion of markets of old ones. Furthermore, supply curves cannot be assumed to be infinitely elastic or inelastic to the same degree. This will be one factor causing relative prices to change as growth proceeds. Demand patterns will change in response to the inevitable changes in relative prices, so that cross elasticities also will be important in determining the directions in which consumers in a growing economy will spend their rising incomes.

Hitherto we have been discussing the case of a closed economy. We must now indicate briefly the role of foreign trade. Obviously, we must count among the resources of the single country those that are available through trade. The limitational factor represented by a highly inelastic supply of a resource may be mitigated by obtaining the resource from a foreign country where the resource is characterized by relatively greater supply elasticity.

The opportunity for trade will have to make its appearance as soon as the domestic supply schedules of some commodities become highly inelastic relative to the respective income elasticities of demand. At this point the possibility of future growth will depend on the opportunities to obtain these commodities through trade with a foreign producer whose supply schedules of the required commodities are lower and flatter. Whether trade is actually started depends also, however, on what commodities the importing country can offer in exchange, and on the demand

in the countries to which they are offered. Thus in this case too, where further growth is conditional upon trade, the crucial importance of favorable domestic resource endowments is manifest. The ability of a growing country to benefit from the operation of the comparative-advantage principle hinges on the supply characteristics (elasticities and comparative costs) of its exports in relation to external demands.

The country that is endowed domestically with a plenitude of the resources needed to satisfy dynamic demand patterns, or has access to foreign resources through trade and utilizes them to expand output according to the principle of balance, possesses an essential requirement for rapid growth. In the absence of the needed resources (which would provide the proper balance either directly or, through trade, indirectly) it will be impossible to expand capacity in the appropriate directions—and growth, as a result, will be inhibited.

To summarize the foregoing discussion we may indicate the role of the factors analyzed in the context of a steadily growing economy.

What are the salient economic characteristics that a country must have in order to experience continuous growth in real income? We know that at any given level of national income, income recipients are dividing their incomes into savings and expenditures among a variety of consumption goods. The nature of this division—between saving and total consumption as well as among the various final goods—is determined largely by consumer tastes and needs, the relative prices prevailing in the consumption goods and money markets, and the distribution of income.

As time passes, changes will be constantly occurring which will alter the nature of demand in the economy: the level of income, population (its size and composition), the distribution of income, the relative prices in the several markets, will be among the changes that affect the character of wants. As the income level increases, the composition of the new product coming onto the

markets must conform to this new pattern of wants. The available savings must be invested in such a way as to increase capacity by the required proportions in the various lines. All markets will then be continually cleared at such prices that excess supplies or demands in the various lines are quite small. Expectations of producers will generally be realized. If entrepreneurs react promptly to the changes in demand, steady growth will not be interrupted as a consequence of serious miscalculations.

Thus, in order for the economy to grow smoothly, the supply conditions of the many resources needed to satisfy the changing patterns of demand must be very favorable, either because such resources are available within the national frontiers or because they can be obtained abroad through international trade. If the rate of growth is to be relatively high, supply curves will have to be relatively flat or shifting to the right under the impact of technological progress, capital accumulation, and external economies; *ceteris paribus*, the higher the rate of savings, the higher the growth rate.

III

The analysis of growth presented here takes as its starting point the dynamics of consumer demands, and leads ultimately to the role of basic resources in determining growth. The concept of dynamic consumer demand patterns provides analytical links to the question of the resource requirements for growth, to the required pattern of investment, and to the roles of factor supply elasticities and foreign trade in facilitating growth. Among the conclusions that emerge are the following.

An increase in aggregate product depends on the availability of certain basic resource "inputs," labor, capital, raw-materials resources, and the like. The nature of consumer demand patterns calls for some combination of final goods and services which determines the nature of the intermediate products, the capital goods, and the pattern of resources required at various income levels. This is the problem of "balanced growth." The upper limit to

the rate of growth is set by the degree of inelasticity of these resource supplies. These limits may be overcome through foreign trade, whereby certain essential, but otherwise unavailable, resources can be obtained; thus trade accelerates the growth rate *through broadening the resource base* available to the country. To some extent the limits may be overcome also through the effects of technological progress in lowering supply curves.

One interesting aspect of the "disaggregated" approach is its usefulness in throwing light on the reasons for discrepancies between aggregate demand and supply, and hence on the causes of inflation and deflation. Thus it is analytically useful in concentrating attention on *why* there is an aggregate discrepancy and *where* it is localized, thereby helping to clarify the reasons for specific price changes, inflationary and deflationary pressures of varying degrees in different sectors, and the forces causing various resource movements in the economy. One principal object of the argument has been to emphasize certain of the frictions and disturbances that accompany income growth, and are an inevitable part of the process of growth, especially in a society where decision-making is carried on privately and without coordination.

The foregoing considerations lead to a conclusion concerning the aggregate equilibrium growth rate which helps to illuminate certain results of recent aggregative analyses. It will be recalled that a principal end result of this body of literature is the stipulation of some rate of income growth which will ensure full employment of a growing capital stock. In order to clarify the nature of these aggregative results, we may concentrate on the capacity change that takes place between two consecutive periods.

Assume that in the initial period there is full employment and equilibrium in all markets and total product equals Y_0 . Between periods 0 and 1 (T_0 and T_1) factor inputs are assumed to increase by varying amounts in the different industries (1, 2, 3, . . . n), leading to capacity and output increases of $dy_1, dy_2, \dots dy_n$; for the economy as a whole the total capacity increase is their sum, dY_c (equal to the concomitant increase in factor payments, which we

may call dY_t). Aggregative analysis would here stipulate that, for equilibrium, effective demand must rise by dY in T_1 , when the product $Y_0 + dY_e$ is marketed; if this effective demand is forthcoming, and *there has been no misdirection of investment*, full employment will not be endangered, and it will not be necessary to junk any capital.

Let us consider the precise importance of the italicized qualification. It is clear that the expenditure of $Y_0 + dY_t$ in T_1 will not necessarily ensure the purchase (at constant prices) of the product $Y_0 + dY_e$. Assuming, for simplicity, no changes in tastes or relative prices, the answer to the question whether all markets will be cleared depends on the amounts of the dy_n 's in relation to the incremental consumption expenditures arising out of dY_t . Thus an aggregate income rise of $2dY_t$ might be required to generate demand which (given the income elasticity of demand for commodity n) is equal to dy_n , and so clear the market for n . For commodity j , the required income increase might be $0.5dY_t$, and so on. To ensure no excess supply in the aggregate, the income increase would have to be sufficient to clear *every* individual market in T_1 . But since the factor income increase is dY_t , and not a higher amount, this will *not* be the general condition prevailing during economic growth.

Thus in the context of the disaggregated analysis, it does not seem particularly meaningful to attempt to ascertain aggregative equilibrium growth rates. As already suggested, different rates of income growth would be required for different commodities and services produced in the economy in order to prevent output contraction and unemployment in each. Only when the increases in supply in each market happen to equal the increases in demand for each commodity (which arises out of the increased factor payments resulting from the expanded outputs) can we say that a given increase in aggregate effective demand will clear all markets. Only in this case is the increased capacity completely self-justifying—that is, only in this case does supply succeed in creating its own demand.

The question asked in the aggregative analysis—"what is the aggregative equilibrium growth rate?"—acquires its relevance because of the nature of the simplifying assumptions regarding the aggregate capacity changes in the economy over time. But when the analysis of growth is cast in terms of the output or capacity increments in the various markets, a different question must be asked. Our interest must then be focused on the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for individual entrepreneurs' expectations to be satisfied. We must ask what rate of output increase is appropriate to each industry in the light of the consumer demand changes resulting from the rise in aggregate supply and factor income, and the associated relative price shifts.

RULE BY MAJORITY OR BY PRINCIPLES

BY NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

MAJORITY rule has two functions in modern political society: it is the sociological principle underlying group cohesion; and it is the philosophical principle underlying the legitimacy of political acts and political authority. The two functions are related and have a common foundation, but may be separated for analytical purposes.

In its sociological aspect, majority rule is a functional prerequisite for the very existence of group life, given prevailing contemporary ideas. If the accepted theory conceives of mankind as composed of individuals, each with a status comprising rights and claims respecting other individuals, the sociological question arises, how have relations been established between these individuals? Majority rule is a particular expression of the idea of social contract, and hence it indicates that societies are constituted by decision: relations between individuals with original freedom are forged by the emergence of agreement—in the particular case, through the medium of a majority.

In regard to the problem of legitimacy, the principle of majority rule implies that political authority is created by, or at least resides in, men. The majority stands for generic man, or—limiting ourselves to particular groups—the generic man-of-a-particular-society. Hence majority rule is a particular expression of the idea that man—or human will—is the source of political authority.

Thus, sociologically, majority rule functions as an expression of the idea of social contract, while philosophically it functions as an expression of the idea of human autonomy. Sociologically it provides a solution for the problem of deriving cohesion from individuals, while philosophically it solves the problem of establishing authority without invoking obedience to the non-human.

I

Let us examine more closely the philosophical aspect of the principle of majority rule, for only its barest outline is sketched by indicating the problem of deriving authority from the free individual. To this end we may distinguish three elements implied in the idea of majority rule.

1) Majority rule involves the idea of the equality of men. To consider all men equal means to give no greater weight to the status, as such, of any particular individual than to the status of others. Whatever the individual differences in status, in the content of particular rights and claims, the idea of equality values all men alike and determines all political and human rights in terms of a single principle, the generic essence of man, that is, his rational nature, which is one and the same in all men.

The leveling effect of the idea of equality makes possible the arithmetical summation of human wills—the counting of votes. If men are all essentially the same qualitatively, then for all essential purposes, such as human and political rights, they are quantitatively equal units; hence, one man, one vote. With no qualitative distinctions between men and votes, only differences in quantity can matter. The votes of men being equal units, the only possible comparisons can be those between one and many, between less and more.

Thus the idea of majority rule implies two steps: first, disregard for the qualitative differences between men; second, affirmation of the quantitative equality of individuals, and hence of an arithmetical of human wills. The idea of majority rule implies a change in philosophical presuppositions, for it replaces the concept of qualitative difference between men (as in Plato's political theory) by the concept of qualitative similarity. It does not, as is sometimes assumed, entirely disregard the qualitative aspects of human existence. It denies only the ancient correlation of quality with difference, for it correlates human quality with the generic essence of man. To be sure, the idea that men are identical in essence has so far had its major concrete expression in the arithmetical

framework it provides for human existence. But this quantitative aspect of majority rule is rooted in and dependent on the qualitative idea of man's generic essence.

2) Yet if the underlying idea is that of the identity of men in their generic essence, the question surely arises, why is majority and not unanimity its quantitative expression? The question becomes all the more cogent if we recall that the foundation of the idea of equality is the idea of man's rational nature. It is because all men are rational that they are equal essentially, for reason is common to all men. But if reason is common to all men, it should lead them all to identical actions based on identical rational attitudes, so that identity rather than majority would be the quantitative result.

The solution of this puzzle lies in the acknowledgment that majority rule is only an approximate quantitative expression of the idea of the equality of men. It is the actually attained common ground of men who are fundamentally equal, because they have a common rational nature. The majority is not the totality of society, but an approximate expression of this totality. The legitimacy of majority rule is not based, as before, on the arithmetic of quantitatively equal units. Political authority, under majority rule, is representative: it *stands for* the as yet unattained idea of unanimity, which would be the only adequate expression of man's common rational nature.

Because of its approximate or representative character, majority rule has both a tendency toward expansion and a tendency to limit itself. Since it only *represents* the ideal of unanimity, the majority opinion strives to attain total identity of views; majority rule is only an approximation of the social totality, and hence the majority is constantly driven to fill this gap. Yet, since it is only the majority and not the social totality, it must always restrain itself by a clear sense of the gap between ideal and actuality. In this self-restrained drive lies the key problem of politics.

3) Majority rule is an approximate representation of an ideal social totality; as between actual individuals it is a principle of

compromise. Considered from the viewpoint of men's fundamental equality, majority rule approximates the social totality in which equality would be actual, that is, the totality in which men would share identical opinions and act in identical ways. Considered from the viewpoint of men's fundamental individualism, which separates man from his fellows in pursuit of his interests and in his ideas, majority rule represents the principle of compromise by which men nevertheless are able to act and think in common ways. As against social totality, majority rule represents the minimum men have attained as yet; as against fundamental individualism, it represents the maximum men have attained so far. From the first point of view, majority rule derives its authority from the ideal which it inadequately represents. From the latter point of view, majority rule derives its legitimacy from its success in overcoming the major obstacle that social man must overcome in order to exist: man's fundamental atomism.

A basic tension in modern politics and political theory is reflected in the above opposition: the tension between men's generic equality and the idea of privacy, or, as it is sometimes formulated, between equality and rights. The problem cannot be dealt with here; it is mentioned only in order to note that the two possible defenses of majority rule are related to the root problems of modern politics in a more general sense.

But we must also note that the two defenses of the legitimacy of majority rule converge in establishing the rights of minorities, and of dissent in general. A majority that only *represents* social totality must acknowledge the right of dissent because it is only an approximation to, not the full realization of, the identity of opinion and action in the ideal society. A majority that embodies a compromise between fundamentally divergent individuals, who only with difficulty find a common ground, must acknowledge the justification of individuals or groups who have not yet found their way to the common ground of the majority compromise, or of nonconformist opinions which, not having overcome the fundamental difficulty, remain in the fundamental human situation.

II

This brings us to a consideration of majority rule in relation to what may be called, perhaps, the "rule of principles." The argument here may proceed under the same topics as have been shown to be applicable to the question of majority rule in itself.

First, the conversion of the qualitative similarity of men, the ground of political authority, into men's quantitative equality, the ground of majority rule, is certainly problematical. The problem arises because in the practical operations of politics the common rational nature of men is hardly apparent. The social psychology of man's political actions certainly does not prove that he acts as a manifestly rational being. Hence the foundation of the idea of equality in men's essentially rational nature seems irrelevant in practice, because actual political behavior is not based on men's postulated rational nature. Majority rule is supposed to be a *practical* political expression of the fundamental equality, based on a common rational nature, of men. But the fact that majority rule is based on a rational arithmetic is not enough in itself to prove it a valid practical expression of man's rationality; this would be the case only if the votes counted—the units in this arithmetic—were themselves rational, if they were expressions of an essentially common (that is, rational) human nature, and hence commensurable. Failing evidence of practical rationality in man's actual behavior, the arithmetic of majority rule might seem, not rationally valid, but a rationalization, a construction *ad hoc*, designed to make the specially invented ideas of equality and man's rational essence serve as a philosophical justification for majority rule.

Second, if the majority will is conceived as an approximate representation of social totality, the question arises whether it is the right approximation or representation. So, too, if the majority will is regarded as a compromise provisionally arrived at, the question arises whether it is a just compromise. The gap between totality and majority always gives ground for skepticism as to whether actuality represents the least possible distance from the

ideal; what is purported to be merely a difference in degree may really be a difference in kind. The minority may be right in spite of being only a minority. The achieved compromise may be achieved by fraud or force rather than by a true and just decision. Precisely because we speak of a compromise we presuppose conflicting interests. Nothing guarantees that just principles have been the means employed to blunt the edge of difference. There is always the danger that the majority has subdued the minority and individual dissenters by no principle at all, but by sheer force of numbers, which is no foundation for legitimacy. What Tocqueville called "the tyranny of the majority," which imposes conformity by pressure of forces of social psychology, mass imitation, and the power of public opinion, is hardly a better ground for legitimacy. For establishing the legitimacy of majority rule some *principle* is needed which goes beyond the brute effectiveness of numbers. Majority rule must meet the test of what the Middle Ages called *sanior* and *major pars*—with emphasis on *sanior*.

Thus some qualitative test must be applied in order to validate the quantitative forms of majority rule. We have seen above that the principle of majority rule has been expressed in politics and political theory as initially related to the qualitative principles of men's rationality and equality. History bears out the view that the qualitative principle is basic and the quantitative form derived. But the difficulty is that the basic qualitative principles of majority rule do not and cannot express themselves adequately in concrete political actions. What is actually expressed in majority rule is merely the quantitative fact.

We must therefore consider two problems. Are there other qualitative principles that find adequate expression in concrete political actions? Or must the idea of political legitimacy be constructed not exclusively in the necessarily inadequate terms of qualitative principles and their concrete expressions, but according to some other scheme? Let us take up these two questions in turn.

A closer analysis of majority rule will reveal additional qualitative principles intrinsically connected with it and acting as limita-

tions upon it. Some of these restrictive principles may be termed factual, others normative.

It is a factual limitation upon majority rule that there are no undefined majorities. Majorities do not arise of themselves, but only out of the response to current political issues, which define them. In practice, therefore, majority rule crystallizes around numerous qualitative principles which we know as political issues.

Further, the majority is not a single entity, even in regard to a single issue. In practice there are different majorities for different levels of political action—for example, action in relation to all citizens, to all citizens actively participating in an election, to elected representatives. Specific qualities characterize each of such levels—a geographic or territorial location, a defined status, a specified function—and hence give significance to the pertinent majority.

Another limitation of the majority is the fact that it is not the social totality, and hence a minority exists beside it. Factually, this restricts the power of the majority; normatively, it restricts its rights by the rights of the minority. In a free society the rights of the minority include the right to become, in a new context, the majority. This normative restriction on majority rule exercises a factual restraint through the perpetual fear of the majority that it will lose power in the future.

The social order to which minorities submit has been described by Max Weber as *oktroiert*, or imposed. "An order is always imposed," he said in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*,¹ "to the extent that it does not originate from the voluntary personal agreement of all the individuals concerned. The concept of 'imposition' hence includes 'majority rule,' in that the minority must submit." If majority rule meant no more than submission to force of numbers, these extreme remarks would be warranted. But in fact the submission of the minority is not merely a yielding to force. It also involves acknowledging the principle of majority,

¹ Translated by Talcott Parsons as *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (London 1947) p. 136.

and the minority relies upon that principle in its anticipation of becoming itself the majority. Hence in the relations between majority and minority we find a principle limiting majority rule that combines both factual and normative aspects.

Finally, the fundamental qualitative principles of majority rule, discussed above, lead to further normative limitations upon the majority. The ideas of equality and human autonomy imply the principle of self-determination. In the history of politics and political theory this principle has been transformed into the restrictions on majority rule involved in the structure and conception of the "Rechtsstaat." Benjamin Constant explicitly states as a restriction upon sovereignty the rule that society has no right to harm innocent persons or to hinder the free expression of opinions.² Kant, in his article against Hobbes,³ defines the three principles of the Rechtsstaat as freedom, equality, and independence. These principles restrict the actions and range of decision open to the majority. Structurally, such limitations take the form of a constitution. A constitution is technically produced by a majority, but, in theory at least, it does not require a majority to persist, and it puts restraints upon future actions of the majority.

The constitutional limitation of majority rule in accordance with its own fundamental qualitative principles has become a matter of great practical significance in our time. Our generation has seen majorities establish political forms opposed to the principles of human rights underlying majority rule itself. In such cases the majority rules by sheer force of numbers, or of power, and obedience can no longer be claimed on grounds of legitimacy. The relation between the claim to legitimacy and the self-limitation of the majority in terms of fundamental principles has thus become obvious.

The emergence of this connection between rule by principles and majority rule has not only historical but philosophical relevance. It demonstrates that legitimate majority rule is intrinsi-

² See Carl Schmitt, *Verfassungslehre* (Munich and Leipzig 1928) p. 201.

³ See *Werke*, edited by Ernst Cassirer, vol. 6 (Berlin 1914) pp. 372 ff.

cally connected with principles, and that the connection is practically important. There is no real dichotomy between majority rule and rule by principles, but a dependence of majority rule upon principles: principles are the fundamental ground of majority rule, and they also set its concrete limitations. Majority rule exists, accordingly, as a realm of fact between two realms of principle in politics.

III

We have considered so far the relation of majority rule to principles intrinsically connected with it, as grounds and as limits, which can all be subsumed under the general title of human rights. But in modern politics and political theory there have emerged limitations on majority rule which rest on principles opposed to rather than justifying it. The common term that may be applied to these principles is "knowledge" rather than "rights." To speak of rule by knowledge is in a way equivalent to speaking of rule by principles, just as rule by rights corresponds to rule by majority.

We may consider the justifications of rule by knowledge under two headings: the essential and the technical justifications.

Under the first heading the main point is that human affairs generally, and politics in particular, are essentially related to meanings, to defined qualities. Social existence is a series of decisions, and politics is a continual taking sides on issues of meaning, that is, on problems. Politics is inseparable from the understanding of the problems it is concerned with. It implies, first, understanding the meaning of the problem and, second, understanding the consequences to be anticipated from a political decision.

Political decision thus essentially depends on the factors of insightful knowledge and imaginative anticipation. These factors are even more powerfully involved if the decision is to be made not merely in terms of the immediate situation defining the specific problem, but against the background of universal human history and the future course it is expected to take. Marxism is

an example of a political attitude that poses political decisions against such a background. Hence it implies that no political decision can be made without knowledge of the true course of universal history.

Once the principle of knowledge has been introduced as the qualification for political decisions, the source of legitimate authority necessarily shifts. As long as man's generic rationality qualified one for decision, majority rule was legitimate; but if *adequate knowledge* is substituted, the qualification for authority shifts from the formal capacity to judge rationally, and rests in actual possession of true knowledge—and only those who actually possess the true doctrine are qualified to rule.

But the case for limiting the right to decide has, in addition, what I have called a technical justification. This derives from the plain fact that the majority does not have the full information or full understanding required for well founded decisions, not only on major questions involving the whole course of history, but even on relatively minor, isolatable questions. These are questions of essentially the same kind as those that face everyone in his daily routine, yet no one can expect the everyday citizen to know all the considerations bearing on such a political issue as, for example, the fiscal policy of a state; nor is this considered necessary. The majority is expected to decide the broad lines of policy (as presented, for example, in election platforms), without full, detailed knowledge of the specific issues. On the other hand, because of this limitation of the majority's capacity to judge, the rise of the executive power in the modern state has removed political decisions in questions of detail from the hands of the electorate and the legislature, and committed them to the hands of bureaucracies.

The practical results of limiting majority rule by the rule of knowledge are different in what we have termed the essential and the technical cases: in the former, majority rule is supplanted by the authority of an elite based on possession of the "true" philosophy of history; in the latter, it is progressively restricted by the

growth of bureaucratic power. In principle, both base authority on knowledge, not on general electoral decision; and in the clash between these two criteria, both give preference to knowledge, according to the maxim that "truth" is to be preferred to "error," or even to "groping for truth."

This has the consequence of restricting the exercise of political rights. Majority rule is based on the idea of human rights as unqualified, while rule by knowledge assumes that human rights are qualified, and also that knowledge determines which actions are rightful. Majority rule is based on the concept of "self-evident"—that is, self-justifying—human rights; rule by principles invokes specific "objective" tests to justify the rights men have. In the one case, man as such is assumed to possess certain rights; in the other, only those men who behave according to specified principles possess them, and knowledge of the principles is a qualifying precondition.

Following this idea further, we may add that majority rule implies that man as such is the best judge of the proper actions and common good of a society, while precisely this is denied by the conception of rule by principles. Consequently authority to make decisions should be vested in those men who actually do know what is necessary for the commonweal. In majority rule the subject and the object of political decisions are the same; rule by principles makes all men the object of political decisions, but only some—those qualified by "knowledge"—their subject: government is *for* the people, but not necessarily *by* the people.

It was noted above that the principles of majority rule themselves set limits upon majority rule. This is a sort of self-limitation of majority rule. In contrast, "rule by principles" implies restricting majority rule not by qualities intrinsically related to itself, but by qualities separate from or opposed to it: not by "underlying" but by "transcendent" principles, relative to majority rule. It may be added that such "transcendent" principles oppose and restrict not only the exercise of majority rule but its essential and practical principles; they oppose, for example, Kant's

three principles of the *Rechtsstaat*. Obviously the principle of equality is contradicted by criteria of knowledge which establish hierarchies among men and qualify some to possess fewer rights than others (as in the "technical" case of laymen versus experts), or to possess no rights at all (as in the "essential" or "philosophical" case, where knowledge of the true course of universal history is the qualifying test). Majority rule is itself based on a qualitative principle—but it is a quality whose quantitative expression is an arithmetic comprising all men as equal units. "Rule by principles," on the other hand, is inconsistent with any idea that all men are equal units, and it cannot have any quantitative expression in terms of the unit "man."

IV

Majority rule and rule by principles both have their inherent political dangers. The danger inherent in majority rule stems from the erratic, unstable character of majority decisions, which makes it intrinsically impossible to assume that the majority is necessarily right. Furthermore, history has many examples of majorities which vote themselves out of existence politically, by conferring all authority on individuals or on small groups. As a pure form, the majority may void itself of its intrinsic content, denying the principles upon which it rests, and it may then adopt any other content—for example, it may decide to establish a dictatorship.

The danger inherent in rule by principles is equally clear. If principles rule, man is thereby disregarded as an agent in political decisions. But if man is considered an object merely, there is no reason to confine this view to the process of political decision. Rule by principles is likely not only to disregard man as voter, but to dismiss entirely the human element from the realm of politics. Man becomes an object of which any disposition at all may be made: he may be treated as the Nazis treated the Jews, or he may be compelled to commit acts of total self-denial. These inadmissible consequences arise from mistakenly applying to the

domain of politics a rule proper to the domain of knowledge: that everything, including the deepest personal inclinations, must bow to the truth. In knowledge, decision has no free play but must follow rigorously from the dictates of truth. The domain of knowledge drives toward depersonalization; hence the principles of this domain cannot possibly be transferred to politics and rule there as sovereign.

The unjustness of such an approach is obvious in regard to both short-range ("technical") and long-range ("essential") problems. Whether food rationing is practical and just in a particular situation may, in a sense, be taken as a "technical" question. But those who make this decision will suffer the consequences. We cannot disregard this personal identity between the agent who decides the future conditions of social experience and the agent who subsequently experiences these conditions. We feel, in fact, that this very identity confers the initial right to make such decisions; but in any case we cannot consider this case as if it were one of determining the fate of unfeeling objects. We cannot expect human decisions to be taken simply as given, the way men accept climate, meteorological conditions, and other external circumstances not arising out of a decision. Humanly imposed conditions are reacted to quite differently; but even if men could be made to accept them as if they were, in effect, blank necessity, we feel that we are sufficiently exposed already to physically imposed conditions, beyond our control, without man's adding to them. To paraphrase Ockham's razor, we hold to the maxim: *Necessitates non sunt multiplicandae praeter necessitatem*.

The "essential," long-range decisions we have to make in politics cannot ignore the fact that man is by essence a being who decides; and this human quality must be effectively acknowledged. A doctrine of history which disregards the empirical fact of decision makes of history a mystification, no matter how anti-mystical its vocabulary. It submerges man in universal historical laws, in a way not greatly different from the submergence of man in mystical experience. Moreover, the concept of rule by principles essen-

tially relies on some system of historical prediction; and any such system is a highly problematical matter. To predict history is not only to forecast events but to foresee what *meaning* these events will have for the actual humans who will experience them. Even if foreknowledge of the sheer occurrence were possible, foreseeing its meaning could not be possible. That meaning will emerge as an incident in the experience of the actual persons to whom those events occur. The experience will be intimately connected with their decisions, and those decisions are by definition unpredictable.

Hence whatever historical prediction is possible must provide free play for decisions that will be known only after human beings living in future history will have made them. It is impossible to disregard the deciding man, that is, the human element in history. Political authority based on pretensions to full historical foreknowledge rests, therefore, on the most dubious of foundations. The uneasiness of a regime so shakily grounded reveals itself in the totalitarian rigors imposed on men, and in violence originating in impositions.

v

Despite their differences, majority rule and rule by principles have one feature in common. Each tries to construct political structure entirely as a necessary consequence of its own fundamental ideas. Majority rule derives all legitimate authority from the principles of human rationality and equality which it embodies. Rule by principles establishes some theory or defined end of society as the guiding principle of political existence. In both, political actuality and human life simply embody an idea, and from this idea both derive all the value they have. They are not independent, but express principles upon which they are *grounded*, as in the case of majority rule, or by which they are *directed*, as in the case of rule by principles.

The two cases have still another connection. Rule by principles is a direct consequence of majority rule. This is true not only in respect to the self-limitation of majority rule by the qualitative

principles upon which it is founded. There is also a dialectical relationship between majority rule and rule by principles. Majority rule is based on the principle of human rationality. Rationality manifests itself primarily in the content of knowledge, and in conduct conforming to knowledge. Hence the very principle underlying majority rule seems to impose an obligation on men to conform to rational principles presented as the content of knowledge, whether it be the principle of the unity of man, his fundamental freedom—or organizational forms such as those of the totalitarian state deriving from “true” knowledge.

The unilinear relation of structure to ideas in both main political theories sheds light on another aspect of political behavior. A major problem of all political forms is the way in which authority is to restrain itself in its use of power. Both majority rule and rule by principles assume a self-regulating mechanism implicit in the exercise of power under the ruling idea. Majority rule regulates itself in conformity with its underlying principles of equality and human freedom. Rule by principles regulates itself by the discipline of rationality, just as science regulates itself by the nature of its problems and the rule of methodical solution.

Here, however, is the point of acute danger in both theories. When a self-regulating mechanism is assumed in any social “organism”—as, for example, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”—anything that happens may be said to be justified in its context. There is no need to act specifically to right whatever may seem wrong, because the self-regulating principle will do the work—and, in fact, the apparent wrong is really an expression of some healthful process. In the meantime, actual human existence is exposed to harm, while man is reduced to a passive object of history.

The only way to meet this problem is to abandon all monistic theories of politics. Two principles express themselves in politics: on the one hand, the human principle; and on the other, the principle of the content of knowledge, the specific problems and ideals of society. Both principles define the conception of legitimate political authority. To speak of a human factor in politics

may seem like a trivial assumption. But our experience of consequences of rule by doctrine in disregard of the human factor has shown it to be far from trivial. Politics must ground its authority in knowledge lest the human factor uncontrolled lead us on an erratic, capricious course, deteriorating into hysteria. But the directives of specific principle must respect limits set by the countervailing force, the human factor, which is the subject and medium for realizing principles. To preserve the human agent and medium of political society is a first principle—hence all specific principles, to be legitimate, must be *humane*. Principles restrain the erraticism of the human factor, while the human factor is a restraint on the cruelly impersonal tendency of principles.

We thus arrive at a bisymmetrical structure of political authority. It is grounded, on one side, upon men's acknowledgment of the principle (or principles) of legitimate authority. This principle has value because it is acknowledged, just as it is acknowledged because it has value. We have here the philosophical paradox of a "solid circle," based on the fact that the human factor and the factor of principles are correlated in political society. The relationship may be expressed in other terms: the human—human nature—is itself a qualitative principle underlying, and hence basic to, politics; yet, on the other hand, human nature never actually expresses itself as such, but always in some relation to specific qualitative situations, so that in actuality human nature is a continuous revelation of objective principles. Thus two apparently conflicting theories correlate to dissolve the inner tensions of political authority, constituting a single principle with two aspects "opposed" like the two sides of a medal.

This relationship of tension in political authority is essential to restrain it from excesses that would destroy it. A similar tension exists in a far broader realm of human life. All human life is a continual confrontation with meanings, meanings which put it under constraint and demand to be lived up to; yet it remains human, factual, not dissolved in the realm of meaning, any more

than mystical experience disintegrates the mystic once and for all into that which is the object of mystic acts or contemplations. The duality of political life is thus part of a wider human duality, and the philosophical grounding of political authority depends on the philosophy of the nature of human concreteness. Recourse to this level of analysis will solve many practical and theoretical problems arising from a monistic philosophy of political authority. Among others, the problem of rights and duties may be solved in this way.

Politics is the continual encounter of principles and human existence. The human factor must keep the direction set by principles, but principles must also be mitigated so as to be humane. If abstract blueprints are out of place in politics, it is not because principles are utterly irrelevant to politics, as Professor Michael Oakeshot contends in his recent political theory. Politics is not completely rational for precisely the same reasons that human existence is not completely rational: it is an *encounter* with rationality, and is neither total rationality nor sheer irrationality. Politics, like human life, is involved with suffering the demands of a dichotomous approach. "Existence encountering rationality" is neither rational nor irrational *per se*, but is precisely what it says: a meeting with rationalities—neither a suicidal surrender to them nor a total disregard of them. Just as existence has this "in between" quality, so politics is necessarily "in between" in its position.

Both majority rule and rule by principles are based on an underlying philosophy about the nature of human life. Each of these two doctrines dissolves the unified Gestalt of human and political existence. The ordinary political problems of contemporary actuality are essentially philosophical problems of man's total outlook and self-knowledge. A new self-awareness of man is needed to solve them, just as they arose from the historical emergence of new forms of human self-awareness. We have gone to politics from our philosophies, and now we must seek our way again to philosophy from politics.

THE AUTHORITY OF THE PAST

Sickness and Society in Freud's Thought

BY PHILIP RIEFF

IT is less as an original mind than as a summative one that Freud's was superb. The ideas at the basis of the Freudian social theory represent a climax, rather than a new departure, in a remarkable chain of reasoning about the relation between sickness and the past. Early in the nineteenth century Carl-Gustav Carus, a lonely figure working between the then sealed borders of physiology and psychology, suggested that the sickly part of the soul is really a repetition of the lowliest stuff of organic nature. During his Croonian lectures (1884) Hughlings Jackson, a great English neurologist whom Freud much admired, spoke of the dissolution of the complicated system of functions, and the reconstitution of the simplest and lowest elements of the nervous system, in psychoses. About the same time in France the psychologist Ribot developed a concept of "regressions," to explain how memory, through some injury, might take a step backward down the ladder of progress from the contemporaneous to the ancient; this he connected with certain exotic elements of spontaneity in the civilized character—like automatic writing. Janet, a contemporary of Freud's, described a hierarchy of steps in mental functions through which the mind could descend as well as ascend to any level. The folk psychologist Lazarus constructed mental illness as a sinking into the fantasy world of the natural man—hardly a complimentary image. Freud only summed up an entire movement of poetic and scientific thought when he announced that the abnormal is the primitive.¹

All these connections between sickness and the past, the abnor-

¹ For a brilliant discussion of this development see "Der Aufbau der Persönlichkeit," in Gottfried Benn, *Essays* (Wiesbaden 1951) pp. 71-90.

mal and the primitive, depend, of course, upon some idea of parallelism or recapitulation. And indeed the theory of biological recapitulation—embryonic development sums up racial development—had frequently been carried over into psychology, becoming a contention that the maturing of each individual mind repeats the development of mind through the evolutionary series. But, contrary to the established image of Freud as a clinician first and a social theorist only through some misplaced ambition, it was from its use in the rising social sciences that he assimilated the recapitulation theory.

Freud barely mentioned the biological and psychological forms of the recapitulation idea. A more nearly sociological version, familiar through the variety of uses to which it was put by Herder, Herbart, Comte, and Spencer, is the one he often employed. This idea—that the individual mind presents in its development a résumé of the stages of human history—reached Freud especially by way of the new science of anthropology. Because he was interested not in the end of the recapitulatory series but in the beginnings, Freud followed with special care contemporary researches into the psychology of primitives. His accent was on the conditions of individual and social deficiencies rather than on their normative completeness.

I

The first locus of the primitive which Freud found in contemporary mental life was the dream. Although he rightly insisted that it had not been scientifically developed, the idea was hardly unknown. In *The Birth of Tragedy* Nietzsche remarked on how the dream, by returning us to the narrow dark corners out of which human culture developed, offers modern man the means continually to revise his high estimate of himself.

The second locus of the primitive as Freud found it in contemporary life was even better known. All the famous anthropological studies on which he depended—Frazer's *Golden Bough* most heavily, books by Atkinson, Lubbock, Tylor, Robertson

Smith, Crawley, Marett, Lang—made free use of the analogy between the primitive and the child. It was more customary to construct the primitive era of civilization as the "childhood of the race" than to invert the image, making of childhood the primitive era of the individual. Nevertheless Freud was repeating a theoretical commonplace when he asserted that, in the few years of childhood, "we have to cover the enormous distance of development from primitive man of the Stone Age to civilized man of today."² He exploited both ends of his analogy, attributing to "primeval peoples the same feelings and emotions that we have elucidated in the primitives of our own times, our children,"³ and attributing to "the psychic life of present-day children, the same archaic moments . . . which generally prevailed at the time of primitive civilization."⁴ Thus materials on the irrational ways of primitives—Freud's point of departure in *Totem and Taboo* (1912), his first book explicitly in social theory—were readily applied, by analogy, to the behavior of children and neurotics.

Freud did not fix wholly on the beginning of the recapitulatory development. He was especially fond of typologies of growth on the evolutionist model, like the sexual-characterological sequence of "oral," "urethral," "anal," and "genital" stages, and in general showed a strong susceptibility to developmental schemes and predictions. Presumably following anthropologists such as Tylor, who had been deeply influenced by the English Comteans, Freud saw "the evolution of man's conceptions of the universe" in the inevitable three stages: "animistic," "religious," and "scientific."⁵

² *The Question of Lay Analysis*, translated by Nancy Procter-Gregg (London 1947) p. 167.

³ *Moses and Monotheism*, translated by Katherine Jones (New York 1949) p. 128.

⁴ *The Question of Lay Analysis*, pp. 96-97.

⁵ *Totem and Taboo*, translated by A. A. Brill in *Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud* (New York 1938) p. 875. As early as 1750 the French philosopher Turgot asserted that the advance of our knowledge of nature proceeded by a gradual emancipation from those anthropomorphic concepts which first led numans to interpret natural phenomena after their own image, as animated by minds like their own. This idea was later to become a leading theme in the positivist philosophy of history, and the way of thinking it described was popularized as "fetishism," and then by the terms "anthropomorphism" and "animism."

The radical turn that psychoanalysis gave to the positivist triad (such constructions are as old as the division of time into past, present, and future) was to translate the intellectual into "the *libidinous* development of the individual." To the charge that Freud put forth an exaggeratedly sexual view of mind, one might cite his strongly mental view of sexuality, of which we see an element in his assumption that the mind no less than the body expresses one's erotic capacities.

Thus Freud summarized the inner meaning of mental organization as a particular layer of sexual evolution, a point made much of in the "British school" of psychoanalysis, with its overworked metaphor of the "introjection" (Ferenczi's coinage) of "good" and "bad" objects. He asserted in *Totem and Taboo* (pp. 875-77, *italics mine*) that "the animistic phase corresponds *in time* as well as *in content* with narcissism, the religious phase . . . to that stage of object finding which is characterized by dependence on the parents, while the scientific stage has its full counterpart in the individual stage of maturity where, having renounced the pleasure principle and having adapted himself to reality, he seeks his object in the outer world." It is a suggestive statement, yet not one to receive elaboration. For the fact is that Freud accepted evolutionist monism only with a severe qualification—a qualification born of the idea's very familiarity. Nothing was more foreign to Freud's mind than the optimistic temper in which the positivist three-stage theory was regularly proffered.

It is the ethical hope of evolutionist theory which inspired Freud's late book on religion, *The Future of an Illusion* (1928). But for the most part he viewed "the upward development of mankind" ambivalently. There was not only the head but also the heart to consider; and one of the ideas most popular in Freud's time was that man had developed intellect at the expense of passion. Von Hartmann tried to console himself that at least our intellects would be sharpened in the evolutionary process, but he judged this advance a horror. "Men would gradually become true devils thereby," Burckhardt commented on this prophecy,

"and at the end cripples from nothing but developed intellect." ⁶ The evolutionist vision of action without passion drove Nietzsche to his deepest nightmare: of the last man, the mass man, whose posture is reclining, whose feeling is ennui, bored in a world in which intelligence has made of living a routine.

Freud's warning in *Moses and Monotheism* against the trend in which "the world of the senses becomes gradually mastered by spirituality" (p. 186) is thus an echo of nineteenth-century pessimism. To fear that "the evolution of culture . . . may perhaps be leading to the extinction of the human race" reflects a period suspicion of culture, for spirituality was then supposed to have shown its power to transform sexuality, "pleasurable to our ancestors," into something "indifferent or even intolerable to ourselves." ⁷ As one of the late romantics in a world sick of romance (reality had become so much stranger), Freud saw the utopian possibility as the end of possibility. He returned to an analysis of origins: if the plant appears twisted, if life begins to wither away, the condition of the root becomes the inevitable question.

G. Stanley Hall, an influential proponent of the psychological theory of recapitulation, well expressed the aim of a psychology respectful of origins: "to conceive the whole world, material and spiritual, as an organic unity, to eliminate all breaks and supernaturalism, and to realize that everything within and without was hoary with age, so that in most experiences we were dealing only with the topmost twigs of vast and deeply buried trees." ⁸ A comparison of Freud and Hall is interesting, for although Hall received psychoanalysis most congenially, his genetic psychology was far more evolutionist than Freud's. Hall interpreted most of the non-volitional movements of infancy as rudimentary impulses to perform acts which must have been of importance for

⁶ Jacob Burckhardt, *Gesammelte Ausgabe*, vol. 8 (Stuttgart 1933) p. 284.

⁷ Freud, "Why War?," translated by James Strachey, in *Collected Papers*, 5 vols. (London 1949-50) vol. 5, p. 286.

⁸ G. Stanley Hall, *Life and Confessions of a Psychologist* (New York 1923) p. 359. Hall, with James J. Putnam, was one of Freud's first sponsors in America, and was President of Clark University when Freud delivered his lectures there in 1909.

some prehuman stage of life. The play of children seemed to him to rehearse in adumbrated ways the social life of our ancestors—a conception still influential through the child psychology of Piaget, in which even in play forms the evolution from primitive magical obedience to democratic consensus is supposed to be repeated. Accelerations and retardations in the height and weight of individual children were read by Hall as traces of ancient fluctuations in the development of the race. Adolescence recapitulates some prehistoric period of “storm and stress,” while the characteristics of children from the ages of eight to twelve, Hall conjectured, represent the culmination of one stage of life, probably maturity in some remote and perhaps pygmoid stage of racial evolution.⁹

Freud too referred to a suppositious disjunction in primitive biological continuity in explaining the intervention of what he called a period of “latency” between childhood sexuality and the onset of mature sexuality at puberty.¹⁰ For the most part, however, such biological and historical correspondences are ignored in Freud’s writings. He preferred to state the analogy between primitive and child—and, further, between the sexual evolution of the mind and the evolution of culture—in highly psychological terms.

Thus he wrote, in *Moses and Monotheism* (p. 126): “In the history of the human species something happened similar to the events in the life of the individual. That is to say, mankind as a whole passed through conflicts of a sexual-aggressive nature, which left permanent traces, but which were for the most part warded off and forgotten; later, after a long period of latency, they came to life again and created phenomena similar in structure and tendency to neurotic symptoms.” The language here is big,

⁹ G. Stanley Hall, *Adolescence*, 2 vols. (New York 1904). See vol. 1, pp. viii-x, 48, 160, 202, 215-26, 264, 356, 366; vol. 2, pp. 70 ff., 192-94, 212, 219.

¹⁰ By this period of latency Freud meant the years from five to twelve. See, for example, *Moses and Monotheism*, p. 118, where he discussed “the beginning twice over of sexual life”; and *The Ego and the Id*, translated by Joan Riviere (London 1947) p. 46.

and vague; and Freud did not become much more specific than this in describing the parallels. Yet it is clear enough that his description is not so much of an evolution as of a reversion. If there are original traumas in group history as well as in the life of the individual, evolution supplies no escape from them. Freud transformed the usually optimistic analogy of children and primitives into a grim disclosure of the power of the primitive in history and of childishness in the individual adult. The primitive and the child survive in *memory*, the representative of the past among the faculties. Against the over-confidence of reason, representing the future, the Lamarckian Freud asserted the ancient claim of memory to a greater power than reason had allowed. The authority of the past can be modified only as the present reconciles itself to the continuing authority of the past.

II

Once upon a time, we read in *Totem and Taboo*, "psychic reality, concerning whose structure there is no doubt . . . coincided with actual reality." Freud's propensity was ever to defer to natural violence as the "real" part of mental life. And this "reality," though diluted through culture, he supposed to retain some representational importance: the egoistic, murderous wishes of the child represent the deeds of primitive man. In the beginning of human society, he said in that work (p. 930), "men really did" what now, according to psychological testimony, they only wish to do. Originally thinking and doing were identical; and the incapacity of psychotics to distinguish between thought and reality supplied Freud with a clue to what primitive life was normally like: "There is not only method in madness, as the poet has already perceived, but also a fragment of historic truth."¹¹

Darwin's conjecture "to the effect that the primitive form of human society was that of a horde ruled over despotically by a powerful male" Freud took seriously as the historical situation

¹¹ "Constructions in Analysis," translated by James Strachey, in *Collected Papers*, vol. 5, p. 370.

governing the construction of subsequent modes of community, the tendency of all regimes as they are known today.¹² Here Freud evoked a modern version of euhemerism, the ancient theory that the gods were deified men, deified because they had lived divinely here on earth and were worthy to mount the heavens. But though Freud's theory of myth was euhemerist, in contradiction to modern social science, the historical figures are themselves bound to psychological ones, and the historical actions are necessary—granted the "nature" of man.

Animated by an older and perhaps more naive concern for the nature that drives history, Freud never ceased inquiring into the prehistorical causes of events. It was at the instincts that his ante-historical research ended, in a neat harmony of instinct and primordial event behind which, as we shall see, he masked his judgment of human nature. He held that while "humans have no business to exclude themselves from the animal kingdom,"¹³ they can be more bestial than the other animals; the difference makes social life as we know it possible. "In the beginning was the deed," Freud wrote in *Moses and Monotheism* (p. 111), repeating Faust, and the deed was a crime. "That instinct which is said to restrain the other animals from killing and devouring their own species we need not attribute to him."¹⁴ Discerning from adult neurotics, from children, and from the evidence of dreams that all men desire to kill their fathers, Freud supposed that primitive man really did kill his. It is "in this particular way," he concluded in *Moses and Monotheism* (p. 162), "that men have always known . . . that once upon a time they had a primeval father and killed him."

In the beginning the will of the group—personified in the primal leader—was the will of each, a mistaken notion of the monolith constitution of the primitive group that Freud found

¹² *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, translated by James Strachey (London 1949) p. 92.

¹³ "Thoughts for the Time on War and Death," translated by E. Colburn-Mayne, in *Collected Papers*, vol. 4, p. 308.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

suggested in current anthropology. Then came the first act of individuality: rebellion, from which moment Freud distinguished between individual and collective development. Individuality gained meaning in Freudian theory as an act of libidinal alienation; the trigger of self-consciousness was the killing of the primal father by the sons. Freud constructed social life to exhibit the consequences of an act of will—neither the routine repetition of animal behavior nor divine interference, but a natural drama inevitable and yet terrible.

But Freud's origins myth does not imply that by murder social life was freed from dependence. Rather, another political stage—submission characterized by guilt—was laid over the primal one. The primal murder, if it cut the cord of nature, replaced it by one that was stricter. Here, politics and religion, the ways of reuniting the many under a single authority, come into existence. For man's will was ambivalent from the beginning, and parricide was an act he at once desired to commit and could never cease to regret. As he desired his freedom he missed his thralldom. Political-religious history is a record of man's irrational attempts to reinstate the primal father without relinquishing freedom. The will, so far as it was free, found itself wanting also to renounce its liberty, not just from prudence—what Freud, too, called "the war of each against all" (*Totem and Taboo*, p. 930)—but also out of remorse and love for authority. As children must love their parents, so did the first citizens love their ruler; his reinstatement—at least in symbolic form—was as natural as his deposition.

Each of the guilty sons desired instinctual sovereignty, Freud supposed; each envied the power of all the others. Some form of inhibition was necessary to control the inclinations to rape and murder. "The first attempt ever made to regulate these social relations already contained the essential element of civilization."¹⁵ The sexual expenditure of creative energy was dammed, and redirected toward building social restraints and defenses against

¹⁵ *Civilization and its Discontents*, translated by Joan Riviere (London 1939) p. 39.

nature. Freud derived "each great cultural victory" from separate feats of instinctual renunciation. The use of tools was a miming of the gratifying violence of sexual intercourse, and therefore a substitute for it; the gaining of fire resulted from some first staunch soul's denial of urethral eroticism; dwellings were "a substitute for the mother's womb, that first abode, in which he was safe and felt so content, for which he probably yearns ever after."¹⁶

But—as is clear in *Moses and Monotheism*—whatever cultural victories man was able to achieve in the history which succeeded the primal one, the original crime was of such importance that it "must have left some permanent trace in the human soul" (pp. 204–05). This trace, Freud thought, contributed an "archaic heritage" in human mental life that "corresponds to the instincts in animals," but differs from animal instinct so far as it includes "not only dispositions, but also . . . traces of the experience of former generations" (pp. 159–61). That difference makes it, however, no less permanent. And the question remains for Freud: how are the ideational contents of the past transmitted? "In what form" does the prototypical event live on in the life of the group? To say that the primal crime must have left "something comparable to a tradition" (pp. 204–05) is to beg the question. How is "tradition" possible?

Plainly there is culture. But Freud thought that nothing "real" is to be found in civilized adults that was not already in the *Urmensch*, the natural man. The conscious transmission of culture was rejected for what he considered a more profound

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 51–52. In his conjectural prototypes of work and first cultural possessions, Freud assumed a universal facility in perceiving subjective spatial analogies. He insisted that the forming and shaping uses of a tool are regularly "animized" as the relation of male to female. With regard to the infantile impulse to put out fire with a stream of urine, Freud asserted that "the legends we possess . . . and the later fables of Gulliver in Lilliput and Rabelais' Gargantua . . . leave no doubt that flames shooting upwards like tongues were originally felt to have a phallic sense." As he symbolically equated penis-tongue-flame from the grossest abstraction of maleness, he similarly insisted that dwellings, hearths, and all other spaces of enclosure—on the analogy of the womb—are female. But there is something more than an impertinent plastic imagination at work here, since Freud made his analogical objects and relations a clue to historical truth.

continuity. The deepest instinctual secrets are not rationally preserved and disseminated on the family model (by parents and parent-surrogates); they are—remembered.¹⁷ But Freud's Lamarckianism did not stop at a simple linear transmission. Rather, the persistence of the primal act must be denied, forgotten. What defines the impact of memory is one's reaction to it, against it. Prototypical events—the primal crime and its repetitions, like the murder of Moses, the murder of Christ—must operate in the sublimative form of tradition as a great secret, the reaction to which is, of course, unconscious. History, as the trail of the prototype, became for Freud a process of the "return of the repressed" (*Moses and Monotheism*, p. 201), distorting extensively and nevertheless eternally recapitulatory.

III

This curious, obviously conjectural account of the origin of society, these grotesque analogical explanations of great cultural advances, lead us back toward the genesis of the prototypical method itself, and into some assumptions of the anthropology to which Freud was indebted.

The most illuminating connection (as has been pointed out by Ludwig Binswanger and Fritz Wittels) is with Goethe. In the decade or so before 1800 Goethe was engrossed in those botanical studies out of which he formulated his theory of the metamorphosis of plants. The form of his theory—the positing of a so-called ancestral plant (*Urpflanze*) which evolved into the multiformity of plants as now existing—has many antecedents. Many of the connections to Freud drawn in this paper must be set in that vaguest of frames—an intellectual climate or tradition that he shared with other minds, rather than a conscious influence—but

¹⁷ Freud thought that "what was acquired by our ancestors is certainly an important part of what we inherit": "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," translated by Joan Riviere, in *Collected Papers*, vol. 5, p. 343. The connection between psychoanalysis and Lamarckianism cannot be overestimated. Freud, Freudians, and schismatics—including Jung, Adler, Reich—are thoroughly and consciously Lamarckian, and assert their science would be impossible if shorn of that strain.

we know much more about Goethe's intellectual genealogy. It seems settled that he absorbed the general idea of the "prototype" from Diderot and Ribonet, and only gave it new exemplification. It is worth noticing how many of the notions of romanticism, and laterally of anthropology, originated in the French Enlightenment—not only the notion of the prototype but also, as we have seen, that of animism. These connections challenge the established divisions of intellectual history and would, I think, throw a new light on modern anthropology if they were thoroughly explored.

Goethe regarded the diverse appendages of the shoot in higher plants as the metamorphosed products of a single fundamental organ, the leaf. The theory of metamorphosis made a lasting impression on biological thought, and finally took a full circle from Diderot through Goethe to Freud. The primal leaf became the primal form, the *Urform*, and this, transplanted into psychology, became the Freudian prototype. In Goethe's words: "With this pattern, and the key thereto, one can still discover plants *ad infinitum* which must be consistent with the pattern; that is to say, they might exist even though they do not, and hence they are not merely poetic shadows and apparitions but have intrinsic truth and necessity. The same law is capable of application to all other living things."¹⁸

Schiller pointed out that the conceptions that Goethe employed belong to the realm of ideas rather than of facts; Goethe did not object. The ancestral form appears to the mind, he recognized, not to the sense. Here Goethe's theory of evolution contradicts both that of Lamarck and that of Darwin. Goethe's is an "idealistic morphology." No matter that there never was an ancestral plant, lonely and nowhere, which then begot all other plants in all their varieties. The transformation by virtue of which various parts of the plant—its sepals, petals, stamens, and so on—differentiated from one common form, the leaf, is an ideal not a real genesis.

¹⁸ J. W. von Goethe, "Brief an Frau Stein," 8 June 1787, in *Goethes Briefe* (Leipzig 1923) vol. 7, pp. 252 ff.

As little as Goethe's *Urpflanze* was a real plant was the Freudian *Urmensch* a real person. The *Urmensch* was not a factual beginning; it is an expedient of scientific reflection and reduction. Criticism by anthropologists of Freud's ahistoric conception has been somewhat too harsh, expressing as it does indignation at an idealism that anthropology itself has not completely abandoned, though it is hidden now behind all kinds of prefatory disclaimers. A more pertinent difficulty with Freud's anthropology is that Freud—unlike Goethe, who was less aggressive toward his imagination—found the ideality of his constructs a handicap. In one place Freud does call his account of primal events a "just-so story," intended "to lighten the darkness of prehistoric times" (*Group Psychology* . . . , p. 90). But Darwin had professed those events as a factual beginning, and Freud could not resist the temptation to have it both ways; he insisted, in *Totem and Taboo*, that the primal murder was a literal historical event.

The sense of deficiency in facts is one that Freud shared with the whole of evolutionary social science, but particularly with anthropology, which regularly substituted for historical documentation a logical history backwards along the functional lines or diffusional routes of the present. We can better appreciate the dilemma of anthropological method by recalling that the science of man is not young, nor is cultural diversity—its central problem—such a recently stated one. To press the matter no farther back than the seventeenth century, anthropology was already flourishing then, under the significantly different name of "cosmography." The seventeenth-century inquiry took as its subject cultural diversity on a world-wide and history-wide scale. But in the nineteenth century, when the existing departmentalization of the social sciences came into being, the scope of the older discipline was radically curtailed. Cosmography became anthropology, withdrawing from the problem of total diversity to the fascinating materials on contemporary primitive cultures.

Non-literate and embryonically literate peoples, while constituting a valuable perspective on humanity as a whole, are danger-

ous samples for the understanding of historic civilizations. Their history-less condition has frequently provoked anthropologists to a programmatic overvaluation of savage simplicities, and to the use of what Freud, exemplifying the practice in *Group Psychology* . . . , called "scientific myths" of the primal form of human relations. Thereby a certain set of events, regarded as unique and non-recurrent, may be withdrawn from rational verification, and all subsequent (dated) history treated as repetitions of the conjectured prototype. This congruence of past with present feelings and social bonds, as the anthropologists assume it, allows the recovery of the non-literate past by observing our contemporary primitives in the jungle and the nursery.

Needless to say, the appeal to conjectural history in the form of various developmentalisms is older than Goethe and modern anthropology. In the study of linguistics, for example, there have been particularly tenacious endeavors to discover the "original form" or "linguistic root" of language in the primordial past or—as in Leibnitz's concept of a *lingua adamica*—in an ideal future language whose objectivity our cognition must progressively approach. But the error is particularly exposed in the social developmentalisms that flourished in the nineteenth century—the theory of descent from a common ancestor, which Freud borrowed from Darwin, being one of many examples. A method that may succeed in the natural sciences—though even one of these, geology, is said to be in historical difficulties—clearly sponsors unwarranted confidence in the linear identities of past and present when appropriated by social sciences like psychology and anthropology.

Freud's implicit appeal to a doctrine of uniformism accounts for a good part (but not all) of his irritating opaqueness to historical change. By his slippery reasoning, any object, event, or relation can be invested with psychological gravity. More a psychological mold than a historic fact, the prototype or trauma may "cathect" with little regard for the context, since the object itself will stand for something else. But Freud's stress on the power of the past, while it does amount to a denial of social and historical

changes in their own right, equally sustained an extraordinary sensitivity on his part to the presence of prototypical motives, often in a vestigial and distorted form, in the artifacts of culture and the private art of dreams.

I have not tried to detail Freud's affinities with the other greats of nineteenth-century science, but at least one more anthropologist—Bachofen—deserves mention in this respect. The similarity between Freud's method and Bachofen's is their recourse to indirect sources in constructing conjectural history. Bachofen's theory of patriarchy as emerging from a prior matriarchal rule—which Freud thought he had corrected—is based on a study of Aeschylus' *Oresteia*, especially the third play of the trilogy, the *Eumenides*. *King Lear* and *Faust* show a similar "Aeschylus structure," Bachofen noted. One thinks immediately of Freud's penchant for finding the "Oedipus structure" in Ibsen, Dostoevski, Shakespeare, and practically every literary work he touched after he first translated *Oedipus Rex* as a Gymnasium student.

Bachofen's method of raiding archaeology, mythology, paleontology, and poetry to discover "prehistoric history" is essential to psychoanalysis, in both its individual and its cultural applications. It is in myth and art that prototypes are extolled, and that is why Freud (like Bachofen) found there mines of the most significant history. By thus assimilating literary analysis to a theory of origins, Bachofen prepared the way for the elaborate and literary Freudian origins myth.

IV

Freud had no theory of gradual evolution from the primal events. They stand isolated in the prehistory of individual and group, persisting unchanged alongside the latest.¹⁹ Here we may note a difference from Goethe. In Goethe's theory of the metamorphosis of plants, the ancestral form of the leaves permutates as blossoms,

¹⁹ See *Civilization and its Discontents*, pp. 14-15: "In the realm of mind . . . the primitive type is so commonly preserved alongside the transformations which have developed out of it that it is superfluous to give instances in proof of it."

filaments, and pistils, as calyx, seed, and fruit, the primal leaf disappearing except as a "form idea." In contrast, Freud saw in all psychological metamorphosis the reappearance of the basic form of the instincts themselves, always present as the indestructible factors in events.

But though Freud's "scientific myth" has no verifiably historical value, as I think we must conclude, it is nevertheless a powerful if one-eyed instrument of evaluation. *Totem and Taboo*, *Group Psychology*, *Moses and Monotheism*, and allied works of Freud cannot any more be dismissed because the anthropology upon which they drew is now outmoded than that great polemic on the emancipation of women, *The Origin of the Family*, is refuted by citing the discredited conjectures on matriarchy and group marriage by Lewis Morgan upon which Engels began his book. As evaluation, Freud's social essays stand, even after their anthropological shorings have buckled beneath them. We may recall what perceptive critics in the last century, like James Martineau and T. H. Green, pointed out repeatedly: that evolutionist argument always shrinks from saying a thing is something, and instead prefers to report that it *began* in a certain way. Freud's idea of primal history—added to his psychological Lamarckianism—gives another example of the frequently tortuous attempts made in nineteenth-century evolutionary ethics to escape saying that man has a *nature*, and that it is largely a destructive one. Man *begins* as a killer, Freud argued. Society *begins* with a crime.

If, to paraphrase Feuerbach, we must look to the manner in which such minds disclose the origin of a thing in order to find their attitude toward it, then we find it is chiefly Freud's elaborate description of the origin of society in a "primal crime" that discloses his basic attitude toward the history of society as a murder mystery, and toward human nature as murderous. In this sense the critical aims of psychology and anthropology were justly fused by Freud. His psychology sought to import into our sentimentalizing on civilized human nature as harsh a truth as anthropology sought to import, by its revelations of the primitive, into our

complacent sense of the progress of modern social institutions and familial customs. In anthropology Freud recognized a great polemical discipline subjoining his own, equally intent on pressing what it gauged unacceptable to the pride of civilization. Everything of Freud's, from his child psychology to his political psychology, is affected by the attitude veiled in this romance of origins. The quiet doctor living above a butcher shop in Vienna invented a myth of human existence as terrifying as any of those he loved to read in world literature. If he was wrong, his error was a great error. Better great errors than small truths; but perhaps, to borrow Freud's own borrowing from Polonius ("Constructions in Analysis," p. 363), his bait of falsehood snared a carp of truth.

Freud's "scientific myth" of the primal father serves other, more surprising purposes when the historical argument is consigned to a proper irrelevance and the evaluative function is exhibited alone. *Totem and Taboo*, where the collective prototype is first broached, is in large part a treatise on the origins of religion. Freud's origin myth of the primal father discloses his own left-handed admiration for monotheistic religion, and offers Jewish monotheism the most pervasive of modern legitimations: that of psychological truth. (This was a subject daringly amplified in his last completed book, *Moses and Monotheism*.) If the first father was God, then other Gods are later, and corruptions.

Freud was thus at odds with the commonly held view, according to which religion begins in polytheism—the worship of vague, plural, local spirits with limited powers—and only after a long process of ethical mastery and intellection attains to the concept of a single deity. By beginning with the purest worship (of one father), from which humans regularly fall away, Freud contradicted the evolutionary optimism of both modern science and modernist religion.²⁰ *Totem and Taboo* is a thoroughly evolu-

²⁰ Nevertheless, a minority of scholars has supported the notion of a primitive monotheistic belief, antedating the Jewish or Babylonian or any recorded peoples. Trying to save the supremacy and primacy of the monotheistic idea, the still

tionist treatise, but Freud's evolutionism was uniquely and pessimistically focused on the permanent limits of development.

Even Freud's Lamarckianism reflects this pessimism. While Adler favored Lamarck over Darwin because the former's teleology supported his own evolutionist optimism,²¹ Freud's version had a consistently gloomy cast. Not its teleological verve but that terrifying metaphysical element of the theory which supposes, in William James' famous definition, "the same emotional propensities, the same habits, the same instincts, [to be] perpetuated without variation from one generation to another"²² appealed to Freud. While Lamarck, like Darwin, offered the "serviceability" of certain emotional forms and accidentally produced tendencies to action as the "reason" for their persistence, in Freud archaic and individual memories are neither efficient nor serviceable; once acquired, they persist in the individual (and through the generations) as the final cause of neurotic misery.

Because he understood the past as the direction of faith, faith seemed to Freud always a quality of one's relation to the past—rather, of one's bondage to it. In the Freudian schema, religion—as the most powerful bondage to the past—is one equivalent to illness. Like a good positivist, Freud did not entirely despair at the sense of dependence most people feel in regard to some higher

Christian anthropology of Ratzel and his pupil Frobenius discovered the towering figure of one god everywhere on the "culture horizons" of the most archaic peoples. A similar notion of a primordial monotheism, from the secular anthropological point of view, was put forth by Andrew Lang, in his *Magic and Religion*, published in 1901. And the Jesuit scholar Father Schmidt, in his massive work on the *Origins of the Idea of God* (the first volume of which was issued the same year as Freud's *Totem and Taboo*), asserted the remains of an original monotheism among the primitives, adding that as the result of some sort of primeval guilt the pure idea of God had been forgotten, degenerating into the farrago of magico-authoritarian beliefs that we now understand as primitive religion.

²¹ Adler, in his *Social Interest* (London 1938) p. 270, wrote: "Lamarck's view, which is more akin to our own [than that of Darwinism], gives up proofs of the creative energy that is inherent in every form of life. The universal fact of the creative evolution of all living things can teach us that a goal is appointed for the line of development in every species—the goal of perfection, of active adaptation to the cosmic demands."

²² William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, vol. 2 (New York 1890) p. 678.

being, as if they were still children living in a childish age. "It is . . . humiliating," he wrote (*Civilization and its Discontents*, pp. 23-24), "to discover what a large number of those alive today, who must see that this religion is not tenable . . . try to defend it inch by inch, as if with a series of pitiful rearguard actions."

But Freud was not only concerned to describe the power of the past; he also hoped to prescribe the model of emancipation from it. He used the "scientific myth" of origins as an intellectual weapon to break the hold of origins over human conduct. Through the scientific myth he was able, as he said in *Group Psychology* . . . (p. 112), to "specify the point in the mental development of man at which the advance from group to individual psychology was also achieved by the individual members of the group." Perhaps the scientific myth finally would free the individual psychology from its thralldom to primal forms. Freud may have been alluding to Frazer's definition of myth, as the earliest mode of scientific cognition, when he offered the scientific myth somewhat facetiously as a substitute for the prototype. "Does not every science," he asked Albert Einstein in 1932 ("Why War?," p. 283), "come in the end to a kind of mythology?" But the mythology of science is radically different from other sorts. All modern scientific myths are myths of revolt against transcendence, and in Freud this revolt took the curious form of a critique against a transcendence dropped into the depths—as the prototype.

Freud took development for granted. That children become adults, the lower the higher, the simple the complex, the unknown the known—these he sensed were optimistic commonplaces with which science no less than religion had endowed modern thought. His desire was always to find in emergence, sameness; in the dynamic, the static; in the present, persistences of the past. The analogy between individual and society was one way of stabilizing the evolutionary scheme, by viewing it structurally.²³ With the

²³ For a statement on the importance of analogy in Freud's method, see two articles by myself: "The Meaning of History and Religion in Freud's Thought," in *Journal of Religion*, vol. 31, no. 2 (April 1951) pp. 114-31; and "History, Psychoanalysis, and the Social Sciences," in *Ethics*, vol. 63, no. 2 (January 1953) pp. 107-20.

conception of the prototype, he read the same permanence in temporal relations. Psychoanalysis, to him, was a retrospective science, never a predictive one.²⁴ Understanding was not available except from the perspective of the patient's entire life history. To comprehend a *set* of events and attitudes, the layers of the patient's memory were not successively and genetically but simultaneously and logically linked. Therapy proceeded by collating an indefinite number of references and cross-references which, organized analogically and prototypically, were related to one another independent of their time sequence. Thus, for example, Freud attached the Oedipus complex and religious phenomena not to temporal developments but to structural relations, that is, to the familial, whose form persists even through changes of social context. Here Freud recognized a natural morality, interpreting the familial obligation as the primal form of all morality. It was an idea he found in *The Religion of the Semites*, only transmuting (in conformity with his pessimist temper) Robertson Smith's blood fellowship into a bloody brotherhood.

Since the material of therapy does, however, appear in a time sequence (as the patient relates it), Freud came to develop modes of breaking up and transforming the material, in order to conform with his essential fiction of the timeless unconscious. With the notion of a linear string of events eliminated, Freud employed both analogies and the concept of prototypes as a way of seeing similarities between differences, not, as in other modes, a way of distinguishing similarities.

Of course, the two tools of Freud's method have differing implications. By locating in individual and social life the instinctual strife in the cosmos, he proclaimed the repetitiveness of human life and the constancy of nature-history; by analogizing society to the individual, Freud presumed the doctrine of the evolution of society. In the one attitude, directed by the concept of the prototype, time is seen as the cyclical return of the ever-

²⁴ See Freud's extended remarks on this in a clinical essay, "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman," translated by Barbara Low and R. Gabler, in *Collected Papers*, vol. 2, pp. 226-27.

same. In the other attitude, directed by the method of analogy, time is a unilinear, unidirectional line of progress. The symbolic meaning of feminine and masculine, the images of the circle and the ascending line, the moods of pessimism and optimism—these express Freud's basic attitudes and characterize his rich contradictions.

So far as one can describe Freud's more consistent attitude, I should stress his pessimism. His hopes for reason and even some evolutionary progress are quite accountable within his generally acute sense of the limits of development. Freud's primary process-image—what we have called "cosmological"—is horizontal and conservative. He saw coursing through nature "uninterruptedly two kinds of process of opposite direction, one anabolic, assimilatory, the other katabolic, disintegrating."²⁵ But Freud found no consolation in this "oscillating rhythm," this instinctual eternal recurrence. It meant to him that humans were still killers, and that war was not a setback, temporary and unfortunate, but part of the circular motion of social development. The manifold of events only reproduced the primitive prototypes. There was nothing new in history, as, analogously, "the experiences of the first five years of childhood exert a decisive influence on our life . . . and . . . resist all efforts of more mature years to modify them" (*Moses and Monotheism*, p. 198).

Even the one hope, the primacy of the intellect, was secretly linked with the "death instinct"; here Freud, the positivist evolutionist, met Freud, the romantic conservative. The line of evolution, if drawn far enough, ends in the same place as the circle of origins. Freud's evolutionary history is as unfree as his idea of nature-history. Ethically, the two aspects of Freudian method (analogy and prototype) end in identity: both constructs are doctrines of fatalism. I have said that Freud was a romantic conservative, and perhaps the essential fact that united romantic conservatives across the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth is that they did not fancy revolutions. Revolution could only

²⁵ *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, translated by C. J. M. Hubback (London 1922) p. 63.

repeat the prototypical rebellion against the father, and be as equally doomed to failure. The French Revolution and all its outworks have become the great divide of political doctrine, and Freud stood with the conservatives, opposed to all revolutions.

This is not to say that he venerated the past. On the contrary, he respected a certain type of past: not the ages of order so much as the ages of heroes; Greeks, not Latins or Catholics; Semites, not Jews. Bismarck, the towering figure of his youth, is never mentioned in his writings, no more than most contemporaries, heroic or not. Only great heroic figures of the antique past (such as Moses and Hannibal) appear to illustrate his values and doctrine. Indeed, for Freud, the study of the present as autonomous would be a form of fantasy. It would be to "experience the present naively, so to speak, without being able to estimate its content."²⁶

Freud's well known pessimism as a social thinker must be approached in terms of his model of recurrent time, as against the openness of a qualitatively different future. There was to him nothing qualitatively different beyond this life and this way of life. His answer to any failure of the future to be qualitatively different from the past must be the great jibe of all disdain of the future: not "I told you so!" but, more quietly, "I could have told you so." All observable presents point to the past. Memory is a temptation, offering greater delights than the present. There is no relief, either in succumbing to the temptation or in subduing it. Relief—catharsis—is only the sense of transition. The content of human rationality is to face up to the comfortless world as it was, is, and will be. Freud's temper was stoical.

This does not, of course, disqualify the prophetic element in Freud's mission. Rather, the prophet compounded the stoic. Both prophet and stoic have as their chief life duty the maintenance of self-identity in the face of threatening forces. Both propose life in a permanent crisis state, and the stoic function of Freud's crisis psychology is the day-to-day maintenance of self-identity.

²⁶ *The Future of an Illusion*, translated by W. D. Robson-Scott (London 1943) p. 8.

Freud's orientation was in another way close to the prophetic temper. The function of a crisis psychology, as of prophets, is to heighten the sense of threat and fear in the face of uncontrolled changes, and to offer a control: hope as the psychic state supplied by adhering to tradition, with the prophet as instructor. Freud, in this sense, was on the side of tradition. For him the "past" constituted the most stable part of the present. Tradition was never remote, but in continuous process of reassertion. He sought to remind people of it, and of its importance.

But Freud's prophetism must not be labored too far. To be a prophet is to assert that there is no way out of tradition, not to try systematically to abort it. And Freud's end, processional and valuationally, was to abort tradition for the sake of a personality type unknown to history thus far, the psychological man—man emancipated by rational analysis from commitments to the prototypical past.

RECENT LABOR POLITICAL ACTION IN WESTERN EUROPE*

BY DAVID J. SAPOSS

As democratic governments were restored in the liberated western European countries after World War I, normal political activity closely resembling the pre-occupation pattern was resumed. Pretty generally the old political parties were reactivated—resuming their old names and to a large extent receiving the support of their old followers. There were only a few deviations from this practice. In Germany the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) not only replaced the old Center Party but extended its composition to include non-Catholic elements; in France, in accordance with tradition, several new parties were founded, as for example the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP).

In general, political sentiment registered a marked trend leftward. The overwhelming victory of the British Labour Party in the summer of 1945 was indicative of this shift. Likewise, the Norwegian labor party swept the country, and it has since had a comfortable working majority in parliament; at the present time Norway is the only country in western Europe with an out-and-out labor government. In most of the other western continental European countries, while the sentiment was clearly left, coalition governments were formed in which the communists in their customary fashion succeeded in jockeying themselves, out of proportion to their strength, into pivotal government positions. In the formation of these coalition governments, no distinction was made between the totalitarian concept of the communist parties and the orientation of the genuinely democratic parties, whether of radical, liberal, or conservative persuasion.

Apparently public opinion, partly because of the terrific shock experienced by the public during the war, had been jarred loose

* This article was written in the Spring of 1954.

from its traditional moorings. The sentiment was strong for experimenting with new ideas and blazing new trails. Considerable legislation of a radical nature was enacted during this period, including nationalization of important industries and establishments, various forms of direct taxation, liberalization of government and administration.

But within a few years a reaction set in, with a marked trend away from the ultra-leftist position. Governments were reorganized, excluding the communists who had succeeded in placing their people in such strategically key cabinet positions as the Interior and Labor ministries. In most of these countries the socialists remained in the coalition governments for a longer period, and in some—such as Austria, Holland, Luxemburg—they still participate in coalitions. In other countries, like France and Italy, the socialists withdrew, motivated primarily by the feeling that by remaining in coalition governments they would place themselves at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the communists.

Recent elections reveal a limited but marked trend toward the socialist and moderate left. In Austria the socialist party is now the largest, having gained enough additional seats in the recent election to elevate it to top rank. Similarly, the labor party of Holland is now the largest in that country, as a result of the national election in June 1952; it has shown continued gains, as indicated in the local elections held in the spring of 1954. In Norway the labor party retains its hold on the government, albeit with a reduced parliamentary representation resulting from a change in the electoral law. Danish socialists registered gains in the 1953 spring election, and in the fall they continued their trend toward minor gains; in Denmark the Social Democrats gained sufficiently to be now, temporarily at least, the government. Contrary to predictions of the experts, the German Social Democrats failed to make proportionate gains in the 1953 elections: although the party increased its vote by around a million in the federal election, it lost percentagewise, and the same trend manifested itself in the local Hamburg election. In 1954, however, in the

Schleswig-Holstein *Land* elections, it registered a marked gain. Likewise in Belgium, in the 1954 spring election, the socialists became the largest party, superseding the Catholic party; they immediately formed a coalition government with the small Liberal party.

Simultaneously the communists have been declining in strength, as measured by election returns. All elections for the last few years in western Europe have registered a strong recession in communist strength. The last election in the United Kingdom resulted in the communists losing their only seat in Parliament. In Austria their vote was materially reduced, as well as their representation. The same development has occurred in all other western European countries, except France and Italy. In France the communists seem to hold to their over-25 percent strength, as revealed by recent local elections, and in Italy they made substantial gains in the recent national election, registering over a third of the votes.

I

In all the western European countries, except France and Italy, the socialist parties are either the largest or the second largest. Their closest rivals in most of western continental Europe are the Catholic parties, and these operate under various names. Thus in Belgium the name is the People's Social Party, in Italy the Christian Democrats; only in Holland is it Catholic Party. Though these parties usually prefer to be designated as Christian, soliciting the adherence and support of all Christians, they are predominantly Catholic in makeup and are motivated by Catholic doctrine. Like the radicals, however, they are not always united. Thus in Holland two Catholic parties exist, one very large and the other rather a splinter group. In Germany the remnants of the old Center Party—operating chiefly in the Ruhr, with Catholic workers as its base—continued after the war as a rival to the CDU. It approached the Social Democratic Party in outlook, and its representatives in the Bundestag usually voted with that party,

but it was practically decimated in the recent federal election; those who survived have since fused with the CDU, thereby strengthening the left wing in that party.

The socialist parties have pretty generally a workingclass base, with the exception of Italy and France, where they draw their following chiefly from middle-class, professional, and white-collar salaried groups. Whether in coalition governments or in the opposition, these parties have revealed a high degree of responsibility in the maintenance of stable governments and viable economies. In this respect they have followed a course similar to that of the socialist trade-union movements.¹ They have seen that instability has created chaotic situations which have proved highly favorable to the machinations of communist and to a lesser degree fascist totalitarians. They have therefore been willing to support policies that are not entirely in accord with their philosophies, in order to assure orderly government, and they have usually conducted themselves as highly responsible oppositions when not participating in government.

Since the socialists in western Europe have definitely changed their philosophy and principles, by tacitly discarding Marxism and replacing it by a welfare-state concept, it is less difficult for them than it once was to work with so-called "bourgeois" parties. They now emphasize an ethical approach and attainment of social justice, rather than the materialistic conception of history with its dogma of class struggle leading to the overthrow of the capitalist system. In their immediate demands, such issues as planning, an expanding economy, and full employment are featured. Thus in Germany the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) asserts quite frankly, through its officials, that it is no longer a revolutionary party, but one that aims to improve the general welfare by solving immediate problems. In its campaign during the recent federal elections it announced that it will promote nationalization of such basic industries as coal, steel, and chemicals,

¹ See my article on "Current Trade-Union Movements of Western Europe," in *Social Research* (Autumn 1954).

but that in doing so it is not aiming at the overthrow of capitalism in West Germany. It is in favor of nationalization because it does not trust the big industrialists who aided Hitler in bringing about Nazism. Through nationalization the power of these industrialists to support fascism will be shorn. It is this thought of keeping a watchful eye on German big business that primarily inspired the German unions to demand codetermination.

Similarly, with the abandonment of Marxism, the socialist parties of western continental Europe have dropped their anticlericalism. Historically, anticlericalism, bordering on atheism, was one of their corollary principles, because of the bitter struggle between the socialists and the Catholic church. Now, however, they have discarded this attitude, and are trying to win over to their banner Catholic and other religious workers. In Holland's election of the spring of 1952 the labor party was for the first time able to elect its candidate in an almost completely Catholic constituency; it was also the first time that the Catholic hierarchy refrained from warning its faithful that it would be sinful to vote for the labor party. In abandoning anticlericalism the socialists have been influenced by the need to work closely with the Catholic parties and the Catholic unions. The old prejudice dies hard, however, particularly among the followers, though also among a great many of the leaders, and there is still a hangover of some anticlerical sentiment.

Since the liberation the socialist parties have usually supported the foreign policies of their particular countries. More recently they seem to be swinging toward a uniform international policy, formulated largely by the British Labour Party and the German SPD. These two parties, for different reasons, have opposed political, economic, and military European integration. In the founding of the Council of Europe they have opposed federalization, which provides for majority determination, and have favored the intergovernmental form, which would give each participating government a veto power. Thus while the socialist parties of the lowlands staunchly championed the European Defense Com-

munity, many of the others opposed it, insisting that NATO was sufficient for defending the democracies, and proclaiming that before further steps were taken for integrating Europe, whether politically, economically, or militarily, Germany must be unified. As events unfold it would seem that a number of the socialist parties, notably those in the Scandinavian countries, are following their German and British counterparts. Nevertheless, it is difficult at present to determine the significance of this development. It may prove to be only tactical. There can be no question that the socialists will be found on the side of democracy in case of a showdown.

An opposition group within the socialist movement seems to be developing, led largely by Aneurin Bevan and likeminded confreres in other countries. This group, though leftist in coloration, does not differ in basic philosophy from the dominant group. To some extent it founds its interpretation and analysis of social and economic problems on Marxist thinking, but it no longer resorts to Marxist terminology. Its original difference with the majority was over the degree of emphasis that should be placed on defense as against social welfare. Some of the left-wingers have expressed themselves rather strongly and critically regarding the United States, and have indicated a favorable attitude toward Soviet Russia and her satellites. Others are beginning to equate Soviet Russia with the United States, and some regard the Southeast Asian conflict as one over purely colonial issues. But most members of this group are also sympathetic toward Tito and Yugoslavia, and it would seem that much of their attitude is prompted merely by rambunctiousness. They are quite critical of the strong-arm tactics of the communists on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and consistently champion human dignity and democracy. In no way do they resemble the left opposition within the socialist parties in Europe in the days before fascism and World War II. The latter opposition unequivocally advocated an ultra-revolutionary program, while this opposition, though vociferous, does not advocate resort to extra-legal procedures.

Both the moderate and the left-wing socialist groups are at present drifting toward various forms of communist appeasement and coexistence. It is questionable whether the socialist movement would assume a similar position if fascists were the threatening aggressors and detractors of democracy. Just as the reactionary elements in the world assume a lenient, if not sympathetic attitude toward fascism and neo-fascism, many of the socialists, liberals, and moderate conservatives take a conciliatory position toward the communists. The vague and uncritical acceptance of the communists as misguided idealists is being resuscitated. In fact, the lingering affinity with anything professing radicalism is reviving among the socialists and liberals—partly instigated by their pacifist background, the shocking recollection of the horror of war, and engulfment in the present appeasement wave. It seems to be an atavistic or nostalgic reaction.

Thus the Saragat socialists in Italy favored including in an Italian coalition government the communist-captured Nenni socialists, with the hope of weaning them away from their communist alliance. The French socialists were predisposed toward appeasement in Indo-China. The German SPD is beginning to convince itself that Russia's proffers of German unity can be taken seriously. Nearly all socialist parties of western Europe are beginning to be sentimentally credulous of the efficacy of conferences with the communist powers, and are growing stronger in their conviction that communist aggression is waning. Even if we assume that Russia and her satellites sincerely want a breathing spell, and really desire to enter into negotiations and perhaps treaties, there is nevertheless a danger that this development may generate an uncritical attitude which may throw us off our guard, leading us to soften in our negotiations and not hold out for the best attainable terms.

Just as the western European socialists' attitude toward the current international situation is strongly influenced by their past experience, so their position regarding an integrated Europe is at least in part influenced by historic sentiments. Their reluc-

tance to support a federalized council of Europe, and their concern with the composition of the European Coal and Steel Community High Authority, are motivated by both historical and ideological considerations. One of these is a fear of domination by capitalistic governments. Even if the socialists succeeded in gaining political control in one or more countries—as when they were in charge of the British government, or as at present, when their party is the government in Norway—they would find themselves in a hopeless minority on the governing body of any of the integrated European agencies. Another fear based on past experience is that the Catholics would control and dominate the newly united European agencies. Of the six countries composing the Coal and Steel Community, two—France and Italy—are nearly predominantly Catholic, and others have a large Catholic population, like Holland and Belgium and West Germany. The latter is governed by a “bourgeois” party coalition, dominated by the CDU; up to the recent elections Italy and Belgium were governed by similar coalitions.

It is such considerations as these that are beginning to influence socialist thinking on European integration and general international problems. But they are probably transiently influenced by the spirit of the times, and there is no doubt that when this hot wind blows over, the socialists will resume a more practical attitude.

To turn now to Catholic political action, it is well known that all western continental European countries, except those in the north, include large and compact Catholic populations. In so far as insular western Europe is concerned, southern Ireland is of the same composition. Only the Scandinavian countries and Britain are overwhelmingly Protestant. In each of the others a large and substantial Catholic party functions, and in several it is the largest, as in Italy, or the second largest, as in Belgium, Holland, and Austria; in these last three countries the Catholic parties were the largest until the recent national elections.

Thus the Catholic and socialist parties are usually fairly evenly

matched, with a very narrow margin determining which is larger. Moreover, the other parties are comparatively small in size. Where coalition governments are formed, excluding either the Catholic or the socialist party, support must come from one or more of these small parties. Thus in Germany, while the CDU dominated the government, before the 1953 election it could rule only with the support of several smaller parties. Even at present the CDU, although it has a clear majority, prefers to operate as a coalition government. Such an arrangement gives the small parties undue power; in addition, as splinter or fringe parties, they usually represent extreme elements of a reactionary bias.

Since the Catholic parties are practically the only western European parties that are a reasonable social cross-section of the population, they include among their supporters the Catholic workers. In those countries with separate Catholic unions, these labor organizations are usually closely related to the Catholic party. Where separate Catholic unions do not exist, the workers are either formally or informally associated with the party, having their distinct spokesmen within it. Invariably these worker groups act as a left wing, advocating advanced social-reform programs that resemble those of the socialists. In accordance with the French predilection for political atomization, the Catholic parties in France are divided, with the MRP socialistically inclined, and the DeGaullists, divided into two groups at the present time, occupying the opposite end of the political scale. The French Catholic unions are oriented toward the MRP. There may be as many parties in most western European countries as in France, but, in the others, two large parties usually dominate the political scene. France is plagued with a half dozen or so parties fairly closely matched in size.

II

Since the socialist and Catholic parties are so evenly matched in many western continental European countries, the attainment of stable, democratic governments not only becomes their responsi-

bility but frequently depends on their ability to work together. This cooperation is most strongly manifest in coalition government. Without such a working arrangement, it would be extremely difficult to maintain stable, democratic governments in a number of these countries. Where the two powerful parties have failed to form coalition governments, both sides have been inclined at times to act irresponsibly, or at any rate to take extreme positions on some issues.

Belgium provides an illustration. There the Catholic-socialist coalition was severed over the issue of permitting King Leopold to resume the throne after liberation. Since that split both groups have resorted to extreme action, which has militated against a harmonious conduct of government affairs, and has unnecessarily agitated the population. Fortunately, common sense prevailed when issues reached the breaking point, and the stability of the country has not been permanently affected. On the other hand, the Catholic party has been forced to cater to small parties for aid in forming the government, and the ultra-conservative element in its own ranks has been strengthened by this alliance.

Likewise, the German SPD, as the opposition, has jockeyed itself into an extreme nationalistic position, contradictory to its socialist international philosophy. It has also become diverted into a semi-neutralist and appeasement attitude which has given aid and comfort to the communists, although the SPD understands how to cope with the communist menace better than any other political group in the Federal Republic, and has accordingly fought the communists more successfully. It is the opinion of many students that the SPD, by remaining in the opposition, has lost an excellent opportunity to strengthen the progressive and democratic forces in the formation and shaping of the government of the Federal Republic. As a result, many reactionary and undemocratic elements have embedded themselves in the government, and considerable reactionary legislation has been enacted. For instance, the German federal civil service retains its former undemocratic and privileged position, and has restored an undue

number of old-time neo-Nazi and Prussian bureaucrats. The same charge is made of the German foreign service. Most of this unfortunate development could have been prevented, had the SPD joined the CDU in a coalition government. Unfortunately, our occupation administration contributed to sharpening the rivalry between the CDU and SPD by not maintaining a strictly neutral position regarding the CDU.

Historically it is understandable why the SPD refused to join a coalition government. Its motivation seems to have arisen primarily from the unfortunate experience of the old Social Democratic party, which assumed full responsibility for establishing and directing the Weimar Republic in its initial stages; when the crisis and reaction set in, the blame was naturally directed toward that party. Nevertheless, the present-day socialist leaders, and particularly their guiding genius, the late Schumacher, wrongly diagnosed the situation after the late war. By basing their action on the history and experience of their Weimar Republic colleagues, they failed to appreciate that the situation had changed, and that the "democratic conquerors" would now pursue a benevolent policy of restoring a viable economy and a stable government in that part of the territory occupied by them. By providing economic aid and otherwise sympathetically supporting the reconstruction of West Germany, they helped to avert the problems that led to the misfortunes of the Weimar Republic.

In some of the western continental European countries, socialist-Catholic coalition governments are functioning, or have functioned. Austria, Holland, and Luxemburg are operating quite satisfactorily under such governments. Indeed, Austria and Holland have functioned under such coalition governments since the liberation. Perhaps the problems confronting these countries were more pressing and critical than in the other nations of western Europe. Holland not only suffered severely from war damage, but a large portion of the country was wantonly flooded by the unnecessary destruction of dikes when the Germans

retreated. Austria, of course, is still an occupied country in the shadow of the Russian threat, and suffering from Russian exploitation.

Coalition governments in which Catholics and socialists participated existed in some of the other western European countries immediately after the liberation—in France and Italy, for example. In the latter two countries the socialist parties subsequently withdrew, giving as their main reason that alignment with “capitalistic” parties made it necessary for them to acquiesce in legislative and administrative policies that were not in accord with socialist ideals. The right-wing socialists of Italy were of the opinion that by dissociating themselves from a government dominated by the Catholic party, they would attain better results in appealing to the workers and others of the population with anticlerical predilections. The French socialists felt that by being in a coalition government with “bourgeois” parties they were placed at a disadvantage in competing with the communists for worker support.

In reality, results so far have not substantiated these contentions of the French and Italian anti-communist socialists. Two municipal elections have been held in France since 1951, when the socialists withdrew from the coalition government, and in both of these elections the socialists made insignificant gains but hardly at the expense of the communists, who succeeded in more than maintaining their position. The French socialist gains are more in line with the mild drift toward the left in western Europe. In Italy, on the other hand, the right-wing socialists lost very heavily in the recent national election, even though they had not participated in the coalition government for close to two years previous thereto. Of course, they belatedly joined in the recent national-election coalition—which makes it difficult to evaluate their contention. Since then they have again joined a coalition government.

The Danish Social Democrats, although they had participated in coalition governments from time to time, gained sufficiently in the 1953 fall election that they are now in control of the government. Apparently their wavering position on NATO, and par-

ticularly on the granting of air bases to our forces, did not prove a disadvantage. Since the German Social Democrats, who have staunchly rejected participation in a coalition government, failed to make decisive parliamentary gains in the last national elections, or in the local Hamburg election, it appears that their ultra-nationalistic and uncertain attitude toward European defense did not bring the expected results. On the other hand, the Austrian and Dutch socialists, although participating in coalition governments with the Catholic and other "bourgeois" parties, gained votes in the latest national and local elections.

Hence participation in a coalition government does not necessarily place a socialist party at a disadvantage politically. And the maintenance of an opposition status is not an indication that the socialist party will gain materially in elections; in fact, it may even lose. At any rate, the socialist parties of France and Italy did not substantially improve their position with the workers by being in the opposition. It would seem that these parties' failure to win workers' votes must be explained by deeper causes than participation or non-participation in coalition governments, or the maintenance of a conciliatory and moderate policy in order to assure social and economic stability. Thus the breaking up of a socialist-Catholic coalition government has not hurt the Belgian socialist party, which made sufficient gains in the recent election to become the largest party. After the election it refrained from soliciting the Catholic party in the formation of a coalition government, although the latter was receptive. But since it lacked a majority it did invite the collaboration of the small Liberal party. The controlling reason in not inviting the Catholics seems to have been a disagreement about fostering government-financed Catholic schools in the Congo.

In Austria, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg the Catholic and socialist parties seem to have arrived at a working arrangement whereby coalition governments operate fairly smoothly. Of course, there is friction and jockeying for favorable position among the parties and within the governments, but both elements

appreciate the desirability of a conciliatory and adaptive spirit for the good of democracy and their respective countries. Besides, the existence of a left-wing element in the Catholic parties strongly oriented toward a welfare-state concept, and hence closely in sympathy with the socialists in so far as social and economic matters are concerned, makes it possible for the coalition to function better, since the more conservative elements in the Catholic parties find it necessary to take the sentiments of their left-wing colleagues into consideration. This situation is undoubtedly a compelling factor in the workability of Catholic-socialist coalitions.

There are, however, differences of a cultural and philosophic nature which at times become profound obstacles for such coalition governments. In Belgium, as has already been indicated, the issue that broke the coalition was the restoration of the King. In reality it was not a basic issue, but unfortunate tactlessness on both sides permitted it to reach the breaking point. There are other issues of a more basic doctrinaire importance which at times create dissension, even leading to irreconcilability. In France, at the present time, the socialist party and the socialist-oriented Catholic MRP look upon each other with suspicion, because of their difference concerning government aid to Catholic schools. The other Catholic party, the DeGaullists, purposely and gleefully features this issue, forcing the MRP to take a firmer position than it feels necessary, hence sharpening the differences between itself and the socialists.

Other issues of a like nature are the attitude toward Franco Spain, birth control, censoring of books and films. On another level, obstacles are presented by Catholic-socialist suspicion regarding such questions as control of an integrated Europe, and by the rivalry between Catholic and socialist unions. Differences exist also over basic economic issues, which may be difficult to reconcile during periods of deep crisis. Dominated by the commercial, industrial, and more prosperous agricultural elements, the Catholic parties, in common with parties similarly constituted, are fearful of a runaway inflationary situation, and hence advocate

measures to check this possible development. On the other hand, the socialists are fearful of a deflationary situation that might precipitate a depression, with its concomitant unemployment, curtailment of social-welfare programs, possible wage reductions, and impairment of other working conditions. These questions have arisen in all coalition governments. Thus far they have been amicably adjusted. But if a serious crisis should arise, these coalitions may founder.

Socialists are also participating in coalition governments in countries that do not have Catholic parties. In Sweden the Social Democrats are in a coalition government with a small socialist-minded farmer party. Finland is operating under a coalition government consisting of Social Democrats, agrarians, and a small Swedish-minority group; in the winter of 1954 this coalition was disrupted, but it was reconstituted shortly thereafter, with the socialists again participating. Economic and political differences exist in these countries too—occasionally breaking out into storms which so far, however, have blown over without too seriously shocking the coalitions.

An important objective in western Europe is the need for viable economies in the respective countries, and it is being recognized that stable governments are a necessary corollary. While sound economic conditions contribute vitally to political stability, responsible political parties are an indispensable agency for achieving a sound economy.

There are few countries in Europe where one party can count on a large enough majority to control the government. Hence the future of western European democracy depends on the success with which the various parties can work together in coalition governments, and on the degree of responsibility exhibited by the opposition parties. We have seen how a country like France, with numerous parties of relatively close parliamentary representation, suffers from governmental instability. Italy, with two large and irreconcilable political blocs (the Christian Democrats and the Communist Alliance) and a number of small parties, is

also beginning to experience political instability and governmental crises.

In those countries where two large parties are almost evenly matched, the small parties whose support is needed to form a government enjoy power and influence exceeding their numerical strength. Coalition governments including the two largest parties, like those in Austria, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg, tend to overcome this difficulty. If a coalition including the two largest parties is not feasible, it is certainly imperative that both these parties follow a highly responsible course, whether in control of the government or in the opposition. It is of course more difficult to control the situation when the two parties are in opposing camps; hence there have been some serious lapses, though on the whole these parties have appreciated their responsibilities. The prospects for coalition governments are not too unfavorable in those countries where they do not at present exist. It is encouraging that prominent leaders of all these large parties appreciate the critical status of democracy, and realize that it can best be advanced through coalition governments or some other satisfactory form of collaboration. This need will probably continue for a considerable period, during these troubled and unsettled years.

Naturally, there is strong resistance in each large party, either to forming coalitions or to conducting affairs as responsible oppositions. Dissenting groups in both parties will of course feature the differences, as they are doing at the present time—perhaps to a point where they become irreconcilable. Nevertheless, these differences should be resolvable, with the appreciation of the thoughtful leaders and followers of both parties that stable governments are indispensable if democracy is to be preserved in the light of present communist aggression. The increasing participation of socialist and labor parties in coalition governments results from policy and tactical considerations that are no longer motivated by Marxist doctrines. The few hold-outs will undoubtedly relent in their intransigence should communist or other totalitarian aggression become more threatening.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF SECTARIANISM

BY PETER L. BERGER

THERE are few areas in the sociology of religion that are of greater inherent interest than that of sectarianism. In the study of religious sects we come across a range of human passions and motivations hardly rivaled in any other sector of social life. Moreover, the study of sectarianism is of wider contemporary interest than might seem at first glance. It is not just a question of delving into the more picturesque aspects of religious life in backward rural areas, or of dragging into the light of day the forbidden thrills that thrive here and there in the religious underworld of the modern metropolis. We are interested in much more than the ritual charming of snakes in the Ozarks or the celebration of the black mass in a Harlem tenement. On the modern scene we find the dynamics of sectarianism at work in places far removed from religion proper—in politics, art, literature, and even within the sacred precincts of science itself. It is not too much to say that in a deepening analysis of sectarianism, its structure and dynamics, the sociology of religion may make a formidable contribution to the general effort of the social sciences to understand the inner forces of our society.

The study of sectarianism has been characterized, like so much else in the scientific approach to religion, by a mass of empirical data with little or no theoretical orientation. This has been especially true in the United States, and is especially regrettable here, since this country is a veritable paradise for the investigation of religious sects. The following pages will present suggestions toward such a theoretical orientation. The concepts proposed here were developed in connection with two studies in the area of sectarianism, the one concerning the growth of sects in the Puerto Rican community of New York, the other concerning

the development of the Baha'i movement from a messianic revolution to an international denomination endowed with appurtenances ranging all the way from a papacy to a public-relations program.

I

What is a sect? How can we define it scientifically? In turning first to the question of definition we must start with Max Weber, whose concept of the sect has been most widely accepted. In Weber's definition the sect is distinguished from the church, both understood as social-religious groupings. This antithesis runs throughout the sociological discussion of sectarianism, and it is, indeed, more than an accident of research, for it comes from the inner logic of social-religious groupings themselves.

Weber defines the nature of the church in connection with his general typology of political institutions, that is, institutions capable of exercising authority. The church is thus primarily a *Herrschaftsverband*, a political institution with a normative order, and secondarily a political *Anstaltsbetrieb*, a political institution capable of using force over a continuing period of time. "A hierocratic association," he says, "is a political association (*Herrschaftsverband*) which maintains its order by psychological force through the granting and withholding of sacramental goods (hierocratic force). A church is a hierocratical establishment (*Anstaltsbetrieb*) whose staff lays claim to a monopoly of legitimate hierocratical force."¹

The sect, on the other hand, Weber defines as a voluntary *Verband*, which uses no force and makes no effort to control all people within a certain sphere of power: "A church is, indeed, an institution which administers religious sacraments after the manner of a finance ministry. Membership, at least in theory, is compulsory, and consequently proves nothing concerning the qualities of the members. A sect, however, is a voluntary association (*Verband*), theoretically restricted to those who are reli-

¹ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* (Tübingen 1947) vol. 1, p. 29.

giously and ethically qualified. The sect is entered voluntarily by those who have received acceptance by virtue of their religious qualification."²

Weber further distinguishes between church and sect on the basis of his theory of charisma. In the church, charisma is attached to the office; in the sect, it is attached to the religious leader. It can be seen that the sect, subject to the process of what Weber calls the "routinization" (*Veralltäglichung*) of charisma, must of necessity develop into the church type. "In its genuine form, charismatic power is of a specifically extraordinary, non-everyday character. It consists of a social relationship strictly based on personal allegiance to the personal qualities and qualifications of the charismatic figure. If, however, this relationship does not remain ephemeral, but becomes a permanent one (community of the faithful, of warriors, of disciples; political or hierocratic association), the charismatic power, which can be said to exist ideal-typically only *in statu nascendi*, must change its character substantially. It is traditionalized or rationalized (legalized), or both in different aspects."³

Church and sect can be distinguished, then, by the simple fact that one is born into a church but joins a sect. The sect passes away with the generation that first constituted it. As a new generation grows up it becomes necessary to enshrine the charisma in a traditional or a legalistic order. Following Rudolf Sohm, Weber regarded the development of the Catholic church as the case par excellence of such a "routinization."

Needless to say, these brief remarks cannot do justice to Weber's concepts of church and sect. They may be sufficient to indicate, however, why a different kind of definition seems necessary. Weber's preoccupation with the problem of sectarianism appears to have derived primarily from his interest in Anglo-Saxon sects, especially their role in the development of Puritan ethics. The

² Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (Tübingen 1947) vol. 1, p. 211.

³ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, vol. 1, p. 143.

differentiation between ecclesiastical force and sectarian voluntariness generally holds in the history of English Nonconformity, and can be applied with considerable success to American religious history, though many problems arise in the latter. Weber's distinction seems inadequate, however, when, because of his definition, he is forced to classify present-day Baptists as a sect, merely because of their conception of church membership. If certain recent Barthian ideas became more widely accepted in European Protestantism, and infant baptism were abandoned in some Protestant church bodies, these, by Weber's definition, would take on the character of sects. This does not seem reasonable. And conversely, religious groups that from their inception have operated within a system of normative orders would ipso facto be defined as churches. The Christian Community, for example—the cultic offspring of the Anthroposophist movement—has from the beginning possessed a hierarchy with a monopoly to the means of grace, including sacramental acts performed with regard to children. Should the Christian Community therefore be regarded as a church?

It seems to me that in Weber's definition a sectarian characteristic has been made decisive which, though widespread, is logically accidental to the phenomenon as such. Although it is true that churches, by and large, possess a hierocratical order and exercise hierocratical force on all within their power, while sects possess no such order and recruit themselves from those who freely respond to a certain religious experience, we must pry deeper into the nature of both these phenomena in order to grasp them fully. From Weber's own point of view, it is necessary to get to the inner meanings behind these phenomena. And since these inner meanings are religious, a definition is needed that will take the specific religious differentiation into account.

As regards this question, Weber's most valuable contribution is not his definition of the sect but his discovery of the process of "routinization" in the development of the sect. The validity of this concept appears unquestionable, and of fundamental impor-

tance in understanding sectarianism. In general, one cannot but agree with the following criticism of Weber's approach made by Carl Mayer: "The method is characterized by two things: by the starting point in accidental historical research, for which concepts are created ad hoc, and by the incorporation of the phenomena delineated in this way into a previously given sociological conceptual apparatus. What is lacking is the question concerning the nature of religious sociation as such, or, more precisely, the problem posed by religious sociation as a religious necessity."⁴

Ernst Troeltsch substantially accepts Weber's definition, but amplifies it. Following Weber's differentiation between church and sect, he separates from both the phenomenon of mysticism, which he regards as individualistic, free-flowing spirituality. He further characterizes the church as based on the idea of grace administered to an organization of masses, while the sect is described as based on the idea of law governing a small "holy community" set aside from the world. Troeltsch's overall typology is open to the same criticism as Weber's, and his amplification cannot be considered valid. Not even Christian sects can be differentiated in terms of grace and law. As to mysticism, it is not quite so individualistic and free-flowing as liberal science of religion assumed—a point that has been well demonstrated in the researches of Otto, Heiler, Underhill, Nicholson, Scholem, and others.

Gerardus van der Leeuw, in some incidental remarks in his monumental work on the phenomenology of religion, does not give a definition of the sect but stresses its character as separating itself from the world in search of the sacred. It is a religious group bound together by a religious covenant: "The sect is not founded on a religious covenant that is severed from another religious community such as the church; it segregates itself, rather, from community in general, and constitutes religion a specific aim side by side with the usual purposes of life. . . . The correlate of the sect is therefore not the church but the community;

⁴ Carl Mayer, *Sekte und Kirche: Ein religionssoziologischer Versuch* (Heidelberg 1933) p. 21.

it is the most extreme outcome of the covenant."⁵ Joachim Wach, on the other hand, within his general conceptualization of a sociology of religion, defines the sect more narrowly as a form of religious protest expressing itself in secession. While Wach's definition is too narrow, van der Leeuw leaves us with the problem of definition still unsettled, though his emphasis on the relationship between sect and world is very important.

American sociology has not been greatly concerned with the question of definition, in so far as it has dealt with sectarian phenomena. H. Richard Niebuhr substantially takes over the definition of Weber and Troeltsch, referring to the church as a "natural group," similar to nation and family, and to the sect as a "voluntary association." He too stresses the relationship of both to the world: "The church as an inclusive social group is closely allied with national, economic, and cultural interests; by the very nature of its constitution it is committed to the accommodation of its ethics to the ethics of civilization; it must represent the morality of the respectable majority, not of the heroic minority. The sect, however, is always a minority group, whose separatist and semi-ascetic attitude toward 'the world' is re-enforced by the loyalty which persecution nurtures."⁶ Niebuhr also stresses the point, already made by Troeltsch, that sectarianism tends to arise among the poor, that sects tend to be the "churches of the disinherited." This happens to be true in the United States, to a large extent, but it falls down completely in some other countries, as in reference, for instance, to Islamic sects.

In this country, empirical investigation of sects has generally been carried on without conceptual elaboration. Elmer T. Clark, who has probably collected the most material on American sects, simply accepts Niebuhr's definition, though he says he does not believe that the phenomenon can be sharply defined. This hardly helps. The situation becomes even more confused if

⁵ Gerardus van der Leeuw, *Religion in Essence and Manifestation: A Study in Phenomenology* (London 1938) p. 261.

⁶ H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Social Sources of Denominationalism* (New York 1929) pp. 18 ff.

theological criteria are also considered, as they are by Clark. Thus, according to Catholic theology, all Protestant church bodies are sects, being outside the true Church of Christ; on the other hand, a case could be made from the viewpoint of Lutheran orthodoxy that the Catholic church is itself a sect, since it does not possess the *notae ecclesiae* as understood by Lutherans.

As to the "semantic" approach, which would derive the definition from common usage, this is the road to utter chaos. The term, as used in the United States, may mean almost anything from the designation of a Jewish school for juvenile delinquents which also takes in non-Jewish cases to a term of opprobrium used by a Northern against a Southern Baptist—"non-sectarian" in the former case and "sectarian" in the latter meaning things entirely unrelated to each other and to our scientific concern. If we attempted to follow common usage we would arrive at the same degree of scientific terminological precision that was evinced by the Lutheran minister who invited to the communion table all members of "accredited Christian churches."

II

The necessity of defining church and sect with regard to specifically religious criteria has been stressed by Carl Mayer. He has characterized the sect as an "island formation" within society, essentially subjective, unique, and transcendent. The sect is defined as an order of spirit, while the church is an order of law—a distinction that makes use of Sohm's characterization of the primitive Christian community as, in contrast to the Catholic church, an order not of *nomos* but of *pneuma*.

While agreeing with the basic approach to the question, I do not believe that this differentiation exhausts it. One must define what kind of spirit is found in each type, since certainly the church cannot be described simply as the absence of spirit. Also, there are sectarian phenomena that can only be described as legalistic; the narrow legalism of groups like Jehovah's Witnesses or Seventh-Day Adventists is well known, yet it would seem unrea-

sonable to characterize them as churches. It is interesting, incidentally, that here the definition of Troeltsch is almost precisely reversed.

The question under consideration is a very complex one, requiring a great deal of further discussion and clarification, but the following definitions are offered as a possible step toward such clarification. It should be stressed again that the guiding principle of the definition must be the inner meaning of the religious phenomena concerned, not certain historical accidents of their social structure. The sect, then, may be defined as a religious grouping based on the belief that *the spirit is immediately present*. And the church, on the other hand, may be defined as a religious grouping based on the belief that *the spirit is remote*.

These definitions have their basis in matters of belief, that is, they are concerned with the inner meaning given the phenomena by the social actors themselves, in a Weberian sense. By spirit is meant the religious object as such, that object which will always, of course, appear to faith as a subject in action. The spirit may be said, then, to create the religious experience in which man encounters that which is sacred—the *numen*, to use Otto's term. The spirit manifests itself to man in a way that can generally be determined geographically, as it were—in a human being or animal, in certain objects, in a specific holy place sometimes natural and sometimes artificially created.

As a result of this quasi-geographical character of the spirit (a quality that Durkheim has accurately described with regard to primitive religion), it is possible to view religious groupings under the aspect of space. Sometimes, as in primitive religion, this means actual physical space. Such a concept of sacred space is illustrated in church architecture, in the railing that bars access from the nave to the chancel, or in the wide open spaces surrounding a mosque; to a lesser extent we find the concept operating in liturgy, where a sacred drama is enacted within a specifically sacred locality. In a more general way, however, this space aspect

must be taken as an analogy rather than as an actual physical description. When it is thus regarded, the social groupings that are religiously based can be understood as forming themselves *around* the location of the sacred. The area near the sacred is that which is specifically religious; outside lies the world, in the religious sense of the word. Figuratively, one may speak of the sociology of religion as an ecology of the sacred.

It would even be possible to make a graphic representation of what is here meant. Imagine a figure of concentric circles, the innermost designating the location of the spirit; the next circle is that of the sect, the next is the circle of the church, and beyond that is the world. This schema also indicates how the two groupings view each other. The sect is the grouping nearest the location, to use the ecological term, where the spirit manifests itself. From the point of view of the sect, the church merges with the world outside, the area remote from the sacred. Only within the closed circle of the sect can the sacred, the spirit, be experienced as immediately present. The church, on the other hand, sees the spirit as remote, having to be brought near by its apparatus of mediation. And the church sees the sect as an irreverent and illicit claim on forbidden territory (what Luther called *Schwärmerei*), while viewing its own position as one mediating between the spirit and the world.

These relationships may also be viewed under the aspect of time, and then it becomes clear that they are anything but static in character. In terms of our graphic representation, the center may shift at any moment. The spirit blows where it wills, and at any time may manifest itself anew in the middle of what used to be the world, there creating a new system of relations. And, significantly, the spirit may also manifest itself anew within the old and set structure of a church, setting in motion right there the explosive dynamic of sectarianism.

The foregoing definition could be enlarged by taking into consideration the time aspect. Thus it could be specified that the sect may be either a lasting or a transitory grouping, while the

church, by its very nature, is a lasting grouping. Moreover, the sect, if it becomes a lasting grouping, has within it the tendency to become a church, repeating a process that seems almost inevitable historically.

This definition is admittedly wide. Yet it has the great advantage of seeing the sectarian phenomenon from within and leaving us free to discuss its many sociological aspects without introducing them into the definition itself. This gives a greater flexibility in understanding the often baffling transformations of sectarian groups. Thus, in the sense of the proposed definition, Weber's concept of "routinization" can be effectively demonstrated in the development from sect to church. A clear and instructive case of this is the history of the Baha'i movement, which began in the early half of the nineteenth century as a group filled with an overwhelming sense of the immediacy of a new divine revelation, and subsequently, through a number of steps that can be historically demonstrated, developed into a carefully organized ecclesiastical structure that would take no nonsense from the spirit. It is not necessary, however, to introduce the Weberian concept of charisma, valid as that concept may be, into the definition of the sect.

It is clear that the church, as here defined, will always require some sort of mediating apparatus. Yet some religious conceptions in certain sects may also necessitate such an apparatus. The important thing is not whether an apparatus of mediation exists, but what it means in the total religious gestalt we are investigating. Both the Catholic church and the Christian Community possess a priesthood and an elaborate sacramental system, yet the latter is filled with a constant sense of the immediacy of the spiritual world it seeks to contact, while in the Catholic church this sense of immediacy does not characterize the total community but becomes manifest in individual piety or in groupings that arise within the church and, significantly, bear sectarian characteristics.

This brings us to the very important fact of sectarian phe-

nomena *within* the churches. If the church is strong these will be transitory. Popular Catholic piety is full of such sectarian explosions, which only rarely result in secession movements; the monastic system, as has often been pointed out, has afforded the Catholic church an excellent mechanism for channeling and absorbing such manifestations in a way not harmful to the ecclesiastical structure. The American phenomenon of revivalism is a good example of intra-church sectarianism. Usually a revival movement results only in a transitory sectarian grouping within one or more of the "left-wing" Protestant churches, but sometimes its force is strong enough to create lasting sects; the Pentecostal explosion of the late nineteenth century illustrates the latter case, while the activities of a Billy Sunday retain the character of transitoriness. It may be asked with some reason whether the proposed definition should not be restricted to the lasting sectarian movements. I leave this question open, but must stress the importance of understanding the dynamic which the transitory and lasting types have in common.

III

On the basis of the foregoing definition of the sect, a general typology may now be proposed, to be particularly adapted to the American scene. First, however, it is necessary to introduce another concept, which is useful in establishing such a typology: that of the religious motif, for which we are indebted to the so-called Lund school of Swedish theology, especially the work of Anders Nygrén and Gustav Aulén. The Swedish theologians have been interested in tracing certain dominant motifs through Christian history. In this endeavor, in accordance with their view that theology is not a normative science but an objective scientific analysis of what constitutes faith, they have concerned themselves with the content of the Christian faith rather than with theological analysis. It is important to realize that the religious motif is not an intellectual idea whose development is to be followed through a series of theological formulations; the Lund

school contends, rightly I believe, that the theological formulations are secondary in time and importance.

The concept of the religious motif, which can be used with advantage in any phenomenological approach to religion, outside as well as inside the Christian tradition, refers to a specific pattern or gestalt of religious experience that can be traced in a historical development. Once this fundamental pattern is understood, as it continues over a period of time, the totality of the religious experience being investigated can also be understood, and the central and ephemeral elements in it distinguished. It is clear that such a conceptualization will always be an abstraction from the reality of the experience, and in a certain sense a violation of it, yet this is the only way of scientific understanding. This reservation is as necessary in regard to the larger typologies, such as that attempted here in classifying sectarian movements, as it is in more detailed historical applications.

Type	Motif	Attitude toward World	Example
I. ENTHUSIASTIC: AN EXPERIENCE TO BE LIVED			
1a) Revivalist }	"Fire falling from heaven"	World to be saved	{ Billy Sunday movement Over 100 Pentecostal groups
1b) Pentecostal }			
2a) Pietist }	"Follow the gleam"	World to be avoided	{ Salvation Army Church of the Nazarene
2b) Holiness }			
II. PROPHETIC: A MESSAGE TO BE PROCLAIMED			
1) Chiliastic	"The Lord is coming"	World to be warned	Adventist groups
2) Legalistic	"A new order"	World to be conquered	Jehovah's Witnesses
III. Gnostic: A SECRET TO BE DIVULGED			
1) Oriental	"Wisdom from the East"	World irrel- evant	Buddhist groups
2) New Thought	"Powers in the soul"	" "	Rosicrucians
3) Spiritist	"Voices from beyond"	" "	Spiritist groups

The accompanying schema presents a typology of sectarian movements as they may be found in the United States. It is likely, however, that the three major types can also be found outside the American scene; indeed, they may be applicable outside the field of Christianity. It goes without saying that the types are often mixed. Thus Billy Sunday stressed avoidance of the world as well as the necessity of conversion, and the Seventh-Day Adventists are marked by a fantastic legalism in addition to their stress on the imminent return of Christ. But usually the sect can be placed clearly, at least within the three major types, if we analyze the dominant religious motif. It should be borne in mind, too, that the dynamism of sectarian phenomena often makes a sect pass from one type to another. Revivalist movements, for instance, often end up as pietist groups. All groups in the enthusiastic type have a tendency toward legalism after a while, with the legalistic sect often constituting the last step before the formation of a grouping better described as a church.

The way in which the manifestation of the spirit is understood gives rise to a certain attitude toward the world. In the enthusiastic type there is a wide variety of attitudes, though they can generally be described as variations of the desire to save or avoid the world, or to do both. The attitude in the prophetic type is usually militant: the world must be warned or even conquered. In the gnostic type there is always indifference to the world.

The attitude toward the world largely determines the inner social structure of the sect. This fact is of fundamental importance. In its social structure the sect so constitutes itself as to make possible the carrying out of the mission it believes it has in the world. Thus the enthusiastic type may have a wide variety of social structures, corresponding to the variety of its attitudes toward the world. The prophetic type, however, with its militant attitude, will generally have strong leadership and organization. And the gnostic type, to which the world is irrelevant, almost universally takes the social form of the circle of initiates, those who possess the secret and guard it against outsiders.

The relationship between the sect and the world is a complex one. It seems clear, however, that a change of pressure takes place as the process of "routinization" goes on. At first, when the sect is *in statu nascendi*, the pressures seem strongest in the direction from the religious to the social; that is, the religious motif largely determines the inner social structure of the sect, as has just been described. Later, however, as the spirit recedes into remoteness and the sect hardens, as it were, into ecclesiastical forms, the pressures predominate in the other direction, from the social to the religious; the church makes its peace with the world and is invaded by the latter's social realities, norms, institutions.

We may turn again briefly to the ecological picture. The sect has been characterized as located near the spirit, while the church is remote from it, and this picture can be extended to the sphere of social relations. Thus social distance, too, increases as one goes further away from the center of our concentric circles. In the sect, facing the immediate presence of the spirit, the members form a compact, unified group. When there is strong organization it is usually motivated by the sect's mission in the world; the bonds between the members themselves are immediate, without the need for institutional formalization. The religious experience itself is the unifying force.

In the church, however, where the spirit is remote and can be brought nearer only by formalized means, the bonds between the members weaken, and the unity of the structure requires the establishment of legalistic bonds to replace the religious ones. As Bacon has put it, "*religio praecipuum humanae societatis vinculum*"; when this bond weakens, the bonds of the world—the area away from the spirit—have to be reestablished. This is why the church constitutes an accommodation of spirit and world, a breaking in again by the world into the area that had temporarily been sanctified by the spirit. And, as Weber has pointed out, the church, like all worldly organisms of power, is based on force or the threat of force. It is immaterial whether this force

is physical; the results remain the same. In Weber's terms, the charismatic authority, which was based on its inherent power alone, is replaced by a legal authority that brings to bear upon its followers an organized system of law and force.

IV

Sectarianism in the United States operates in a highly competitive religious situation. There are to be had in this market any number of systems, ranging from extreme sophistication to extreme primitivism, each selling its special recipe for attaining the *summum bonum* of "peace of mind," "peace of soul," or however the ultimate state of bliss is described. This brief discussion of sects may be concluded by looking into the character of these meaning systems and the possibilities of research that they afford.

REALITY. To accept the meaning system is to live in a new world, a new reality. This is true not only for sects of the enthusiastic type, but for the other two major types as well. Religious reality here constitutes a totally new world of experience and perspective into which the individual enters through the religious experience. It corresponds to what in everyday life we would call the "atmosphere" of a place, person, or even idea. It is not unusual that the "atmosphere" of a room changes radically when a certain person enters it. This phenomenon is familiar also with respect to systems of ideas other than religious. One is reminded, for example, of Jasper's statement that an intense study of Kant results in a "*Verschiebung des Seinsbewusstseins*." Most of all, the phenomenon seems to have a parallel in the realm of aesthetic experience. Again and again we hear in everyday life such remarks as that listening to certain music has one "transported to another world," or that reading a piece of literature makes one "see the world with new eyes."

This phenomenon of reality is present in all religious experience. But what is peculiar to modern sectarianism is the isolation of this reality. There are now so many isolated meaning systems that communication among them has become well-nigh

impossible. Consequently the reality of the meaning system can be appropriated only by a violent conversion.

CONVERSION. Without going into psychological considerations, we may define conversion phenomenologically as the passing from one level of experience and perspective to another that is totally new and different. Religious conversion is marked by the particular "numenous" character of this passing. Here it is always a passing from darkness to light, from a lower to a higher level of existence. All religious experience contains this element of conversion, but its peculiarity in the modern sectarian situation lies in its violence, its "leap" from one isolation into another, its total incommunication.

Our age is peculiarly one of conversion in this sense. Conversion has taken the place of communication, the "leap" replaces reason and argument. Thus the alienated intellectual becomes a Communist, the Communist spy becomes a Catholic informer, the doubtful Presbyterian becomes a would-be yogi, and the yogi may end up by being psychoanalyzed and attaining "mental health." One passes from one world to another, totally new; and so isolated within themselves are these worlds that it is quite conceivable that one may pass back again to where one has been before, alternating back and forth between realities that are totally incommensurable.

CATHOLICITY. The meaning system claims universal validity. It seeks to interpret the universe in its totality, and to supply criteria of action for the totality of human existence. Outside the system lies nothing but darkness and error. All other systems must be either included in itself as partial truth or relegated to intellectual damnation.

AUTHORITY. The meaning system, and thus the sectarian group as its visible bearer, arrogates to itself the authority to command men's minds. This authority may sometimes be disguised as intellectual superiority, but at its root it is the *exousia* of the religious leader. Rejection of the authority of the system is an act of rebellion, which must be expiated by repentance or punished

by some form of existential assassination. This is the fundamental principle of *extra ecclesiam nulla salus*. Perhaps no other sentence characterizes more adequately our modern sectarian situation. The character of the existential assassination may vary. Thus a man may be cast into outer darkness by being officially excommunicated from a religious body, or be branded an inferior beast worthy of liquidation by a political tribunal, or be classified by a psychologizing science as acting under compulsion. The principle remains the same.

GNOSIS. The meaning system may be entered by way of superior cognition. Surrender to the system results in a new perspective on things, possession of a new reality. Thus the meaning system creates what may be called an epistemological elite that has pierced through the veil of *maya*: those who have finally understood the thirteenth century as their spiritual home, or those who have been freed from the shackles of "bourgeois consciousness," or those who have sat in an orgone box. Awareness of this superior cognition imparts self-confidence toward those outside. The greatest danger occurs, then, when someone from the outside shows understanding of the "gnostic corpus" and still does not identify himself with it. It is interesting to observe that adherents of sectarian movements will always assume that one is ignorant of the fundamentals of their faith, even if they have been shown the contrary. Only the ignorant can refuse to believe. It is inconceivable—that is, too dangerous to conceive—that someone may know the "secret" and not accept it.

SALVATION. The ultimate aim of the meaning system is to bring salvation to its believers. The salvation is already there, lying in the meaning that life now receives. Consequently the adherents of the sectarian movement must constantly pretend to superior happiness in addition to superior cognition. Those on the outside are not only ignorant but deeply wretched.

COMMUNITY. The meaning system is socially manifest in the community of believers, those who possess the new reality and now confront the world that is still in darkness. Here is the

koinonia, whose duty it is to proclaim the message to the world, or sometimes to protect its valued treasure from the world. As we have seen, the relationship between the community and the world is one of tension, undergoing important changes as the community develops over a period of time.

ESCHATOLOGY. There is in sectarian movements a sense of historical destiny, even in those whose message is essentially ahistorical. The meaning system is frequently understood as a new order in time, a significant stage or the culmination of a historical process of salvation.

APOLOGETIC. Since the meaning system claims to grasp the world in totality, its categories must be made to include all there is. Every fact must be fitted in, every argument must be answered. There must also be categories to take care of all the other meaning systems, and of the ways of passing from one to another; that is, there must be a theory of conversion and apostasy. In sectarian movements of low sophistication the intellectual tools for making a good job of this are of course lacking, but the drive is there *in nucleo*, in intention if not in execution.

SEELSORGE. Just as the meaning system must correlate all the outside world with its own categories, it must perform this function in regard to the questions arising within. In other words, there must be a theory of doubt and a mechanism for dealing with doubt. Doubt must be organized within the system, and all means must be used to prevent it from resulting in a "leap" outside the system. Every meaning system develops its own mechanism for organizing doubt—the confessional, "autocriticism," the breakdown of "resistance." The purpose is always the same: the doubt itself must be interpreted by categories derived from within the system. In no circumstances must the doubt be permitted to break through the isolation within which the particular meaning system alone appears plausible.

The whole area of sectarianism is a rich field for potential research. There is ample room for both theoretical and practical

work. We need carefully worked out monographs on a number of sectarian movements in this country that have never been the object of scientific study. Also we need systematic investigation of the processes within these movements, some of which have here been indicated: the relationship between religious motif and social structure, the development of ecclesiastical forms out of sectarian movements, the development and changes of sectarian leadership. In an area where psychology and sociology meet, we require considerably more light on the phenomena of conversion. The task of analyzing the thought patterns of sectarian meaning systems is one in which the sociologist would require the help of the epistemologist as well as that of the psychologist. Finally, we have not as yet a sufficiently clear picture of the role of sectarianism in the total religious scene in the United States.

BOOK REVIEWS

ICKES, HAROLD L. *The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes*. Vol. 1: *The First Thousand Days, 1933-1936*; 1953, xii & 738 pp. Vol. 2: *The Inside Struggle, 1936-1939*; 1954, 759 pp. New York: Simon and Schuster. Each \$6.

These two volumes cover the first, and crucial, nine years of the New Deal. They are based on the written record that Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior kept of his daily doings while in office. Ickes, who had a remarkable memory, at the end of each working day jotted down whom he saw and what was said; then, every Saturday or Sunday, he would dictate a full summary based on the daily memoranda. The total of these summaries, covering the nineteen years in Washington, from 1933 to 1952, amounts to around six million words. The volumes under review, and those to follow, are based on these journals. In her Preface, Mrs. Ickes states that only technical details have been, and will be, omitted, and that "other parts will have to wait until the death of many living persons." Otherwise there are no changes in the text. The whole diary, filling about one hundred volumes of typed copy, will ultimately go to the Library of Congress.

We have here a remarkable source of materials that will be invaluable to political scientists and historians of the Roosevelt era. For Ickes had all the qualities that go into the making of a great diarist. He had a sense of history and a considerable knowledge of it; indeed, he read much in the fields of American and European history. As a matter of fact, despite his carefully cultivated air of a rough politician—a "curmudgeon," he called himself—Ickes was a man of wide reading, culture, and taste. He was acutely aware that his position as a key member in the Roosevelt administration gave him a front seat, so to speak, whence he could observe and record one of the great historic events of our time. Thus he took full advantage of his privileged post to write down what he saw, heard, or said; and being a person of boundless energy, he saw, heard, and spoke more than most of his fellow New Dealers.

In addition, Ickes was a shrewd observer, disenchanted, mordant, jaundiced, and always lively. His diary, therefore, has a special tang, although there are dull and arid stretches in it. Finally, and perhaps most important of all in regard to his diary, Ickes was to the bottom of his soul a true *homo politicus*. He ate, drank, lived, thought politics. He relished political power. He loved political gossip. He

throve on political in-fighting. He enjoyed political intrigue. With the possible exception of his love for dahlias, politics was his life's passion. The diary faithfully reflects this fundamental aspect of his character.

Until Roosevelt appointed him to high office, Ickes had never occupied any important position. This was not for lack of trying. He became active in local Chicago politics as soon as he left the University, but he was on the reform side—which, by definition, meant the losing side. In the rollicking days of the Chicago machine, run by characters like Hinky Dink and Big Bill Thompson, the successful politician was one who when bought would stay bought, and he was usually bought. A reformer, in those mauve, purple, and gaudy decades, had about as much chance of being elected to office as the proverbial snowball in Gehenna. But Ickes found it a lot of fun trying. Chicago politics, between 1897 when Ickes was graduated from the University, and 1933, when he became Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior, was a wonderful school for a reformer with a sharp eye. Ickes was not particularly unhappy at the defeats of his reform friends, which took place with monotonous and predictable regularity. He expected nothing else. But he enjoyed the rough and tumble of it and, furthermore, he was enough of a spiritual Calvinist to feel convinced that the effort at reform was a good thing in itself.

By inclination and experience he developed a No-complex. He felt fine and righteous and glowing when he could smite the heathen, smack the opposition, challenge the smug powers that be. Thus he was, at one time or another, a Republican, a Progressive, a Bull Mooser, and a Democrat—and practically always in the minority. He was one of the few delegates to the Republican convention of 1920 to shout a joyous No to the nomination of the ineffable Warren Gamaliel Harding, thus preventing it from being unanimous. Ickes was as proud of that defiant negation as if it were a political victory. Morally it was—a victory of sorts.

In 1932 he became a Republican for Roosevelt. What moved him was probably more a contempt for Hoover than love for Roosevelt, of whom neither he nor the majority of the American people knew very much in those days. He had no illusions and expected but small, if any, reward for himself after Roosevelt's victory in November. At most he wanted to be Commissioner of Indian Affairs, since he and the first Mrs. Ickes had long been active in behalf of America's most mistreated and most maligned original minority. He went to New York to meet Roosevelt, and the President-elect, who had never seen

or probably even heard of the chunky little Chicago ex-Republican reformer, immediately liked what he called the "cut of his jib." Then, with his love for the dramatic, Roosevelt took Ickes by complete surprise when he said to him: "Mr. Ickes, you and I have been speaking the same language for the past twenty years. I have been having difficulty finding a Secretary of the Interior. I want a man who can stand on his own feet. Above all things, I want a man who is honest, and I have come to the conclusion that the man I want is Harold L. Ickes, of Chicago."

Thus began a close relationship between the two men and also one of the more important Cabinet careers in American history. Ickes was to remain in office for thirteen years, longer than any other Secretary of the Interior before or since. He took over a Department that had been, under Harding, scandal-ridden, and turned it into one of the best-run and most progressive agencies in the federal government. To everybody's surprise, including probably his own, Ickes, who was nearly sixty when he assumed office and who had never held a political or managerial job in his life, turned out to be a superb administrator. And Roosevelt, observing this strange man with his astonishing talent for getting things done, piled more and more responsibilities upon him until, under the New Deal, Ickes became one of the half-dozen most powerful persons in Washington.

To observe Ickes in action was in itself something of a political education. He worked from early morning to late at night, coming earlier and leaving later than any of his much younger employees. His trust in human nature being strictly limited, he took nothing for granted. Unlike so many big executives, Ickes did not sign documents without first perusing them. This was particularly true of leases, which in the days of the Public Works Administration ran into the thousands. Sheer paper work finally sapped his strength; within a few years he had a serious breakdown, from which he required weeks to recover.

As a public servant with an acute sense of responsibility and integrity, he could not and would not avoid details which, while they could be easily delegated to subordinates, might nevertheless leave loopholes that would tempt the unscrupulous. And he was fiercely determined that his Department, whose vast wealth was a natural temptation to crooks and chiselers, should be like Caesar's wife. For his conception of public service was as stern and as elevated as that of George Washington. An honesty that was almost obsessive and a single-minded dedication to the public weal were the basic moral principles by which

he was guided. "Honest Harold," the sobriquet which even his enemies thrust upon him (as if it were some kind of insult!), was fully and richly deserved. For thirteen years he handled billions of dollars of Public Works funds and administered America's basic resources—timber, petroleum, lands, natural gas, parks, minerals, fisheries, reservations, irrigation, and hydroelectric power—and there was never even a breath of scandal. He was as worriedly careful of the public's money as he was, being part Scotsman, of his own.

Ickes could smell skullduggery a mile away; and as for graft, his olfactory sense was positively uncanny. Woe to those whom he even suspected of dishonesty. His suspicions were so great that during his early days in office he even went so far as to set up a secret service inside the Department of Interior. He, the professed liberal, was thus not above instituting a system that would spy on employees. There was an outcry against this, as a public scandal, and Ickes abandoned both the spying system and its chief, albeit somewhat sheepishly. If he felt that he erred, then he was sure that he erred on the side of the angels.

While distrustful of others, he rarely doubted himself. This was both his strength as a public figure and his weakness as a human being. His righteousness was, indeed, monumental. It led him to outbursts of indignation wherever and whenever he saw or thought he detected dishonesty, disloyalty, or illiberalism. As a rule, his tendency was to lash out first and inquire afterwards. For he was a man absolutely without fear, and he dearly loved a fight. Sometimes one felt that he was not happy unless he was in the midst of battle, any battle, provided he was sure that he was smiting the politically sinful and unrighteous. His fights were legion. At one time or another he took on LaGuardia, Wallace, Hull, General Johnson, John L. Lewis, Huey Long, Martin Dies, Hitler, Hirohito, Mussolini, McCarthy and a host of others, the known and the less known. What made him so formidable a battler was his lack of self-criticism. He never for a moment doubted that he was fighting for justice, for liberalism, for decency—and often, indeed, he was right.

What did this unusual public servant—unquestionably one of the great Cabinet figures in American history—stand for? Essentially he was a late-nineteenth-century American liberal, deriving in direct line from the Middle Western populists. He was, as a matter of fact, proud to have been a Rooseveltian (Theodore) Bull Mooser and a Mugwump. Liberals of Ickes type were invariably for the underdog, for civil liberties, for whatever social reform was momentarily uppermost in

the minds of the reformers. They were also invariably against Big Business, against "the interests" (or "Wall Street"), against corrupt politicians, and against reactionaries of all stripes. They fought all outcroppings of injustice, and strove to improve the lot of minorities. As Secretary of the Interior, Ickes was probably the first United States Cabinet member to give important posts to Negroes, and to abolish segregation in the Department dining rooms. He also appointed many Jews to high office, in some instances to the highest positions in the Department. There was in him a deep respect and sympathy for America's colored people, and an abiding affection and admiration for Jews.

One of his most pleasant tasks as Secretary of the Interior was the inauguration of a genuine New Deal for the American Indians. They had long aroused his sympathies by their miserable plight, and now, at last, he was in a position to do something for that downtrodden minority. He and his friend John Collier, whom he made Commissioner of Indian Affairs, labored mightily to raise the Indians' standard of living, to give them a new lease on life by arousing their pride in their ancient craftsmanship, and to reform their political organization. In this respect there is an illuminating passage in his diary (June 8, 1933), referring to a Congressional delegation that came to see him about some Indian matter:

I told them . . . that we had exploited the Indians from the beginning; that we had taken from them their lands; that we had robbed them right and left; that the diseases they were suffering from were due in a large measure to contacts with the whites and were not unrelated to undernourishment. I said that Congress . . . had assisted in despoiling them and that the man who was largely responsible for Indian appropriations in the House of Representatives for many years had gone publicly on record to the effect that eleven cents a day was enough to feed an Indian child. I added that this same man, after he had been defeated for Congress, crowded himself into this Department [Interior] at a fine big salary, and that it gave me great joy, as one of my first official acts after I came to Washington, to fire him.

In this passage there is all of Ickes—social justice, righteous indignation, truculence vis-à-vis a powerful political group, courage, and drastic action.

Ickes' relations with Franklin D. Roosevelt were, by and large, cordial, although the Secretary was incapable of truckling to the

President. Almost despite himself, Ickes came to admire FDR, and was always flattered by the President's friendliness and compliments. He was not blind to FDR's shortcomings, and he would sometimes make tart comments about them in private. But the two men, taking each other's measure, remained solidly loyal and appreciative. The President soon discovered that in Ickes he had a real jewel—a man of total loyalty to himself, a great administrator, and an utterly brave and willing fighter for New Deal causes. Where else, in all of America, could FDR have found another Ickes?

The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes is, beyond doubt, a major contribution to American political history. It is well edited and nicely printed. Its index includes brief biographic details which are most helpful to the reader. As the New Deal recedes more and more into history, these volumes will become indispensable to historians. They are not only a marvelous source of historic materials but also an intimate self-portrait of a political type that is, alas, rapidly disappearing from American life.

SAUL K. PADOVER

WANKLYN, HARRIET. *Czechoslovakia: A Geographical and Historical Study*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger. 1954. xviii & 445 pp. \$6.25.

The publication of a new book on Czechoslovakia is welcome news to all those interested in the most highly developed, most thoroughly industrialized country on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Miss Wanklyn is, in the first place, a geographer, and the chapters devoted to the physical and the economic geography of the country are clearly the best in the book, showing careful scholarship and offering a considerable wealth of geographic material, much of it so far unpublished in English. There is also a chapter on population and settlement, which is informative in general though it might have benefited from a more thorough and more up-to-date use of existing statistical material, especially the excellent yearbooks published by the Statistical Office of the Czechoslovak government right up to the time of Munich.

Less commendable, however, is the treatment of Czechoslovak history. The chapter dealing with it, about 80 pages somewhat oddly squeezed in between the chapter on vegetation and that on farming, might well have been omitted, since a satisfactory historical background is generally offered in the discussions of the economic developments, and since the English-speaking reader has been provided with an excellent short history through the reissue of S. H. Thomson's book.

Clearly the author is much less familiar with the history than with the geography of the country. The historical chapter shows a somewhat less than adequate understanding of the structural relationship of Bohemia to the Empire, and of the dependencies of the Bohemian Crown to Bohemia herself. This is evident, for instance, in the repeated use of the name Moravia-Silesia as describing one combined unit, which is correct only for the later years of the First Republic. The term may be tolerable in referring to the time after 1740, when Hapsburg Silesia had become a minor dependency of the Crown of St. Wenceslas; it is quite impossible when used regularly in discussing events of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries (pp. 156-66), when Moravia was much more closely linked with Bohemia than either of the Czech lands was with Silesia.

Occasionally this lack of complete familiarity with the history and the language of the Czechs intrudes even into pure geography. There is, for instance, a detailed treatment of that portion of southern Bohemia called here the "Lake Regions," especially the districts around Trebon; it is quite true, of course, that these districts contain a large number of bodies of water, but each of them is what is called in Czech a *rybník*, meaning not a lake but a man-made fishpond, the original damming of which is known in most cases as a fact of Bohemia's economic history. It is little lapses like this which show how difficult a job the author picked for herself, especially since the time she spent in the country was limited to two trips in 1933 and 1947, both, it seems, lasting only a few months.

But with due regard for these limitations, it has to be acknowledged that as a careful compilation and organization of geographical facts the book has real value. The description and discussion of the various regions are lively, instructive, and well written. Also, the book is richly illustrated by photographs, of which not a few were taken by the author herself, and by a great wealth of maps, most of them well chosen and helpful. In the sequence of economic chapters, beginning with the natural resources, including especially soils and vegetation, and going on through the forests and forest industries, problems of agriculture, industry, trade, and communications, the author has consistently emphasized the enormous contrast in industrialization and standards of living between the richer west—Bohemia and Moravia—and the much poorer Slovakian east. The difficult issues and the history of the land reform are treated with understanding and objectivity.

Perhaps most interesting, because most topical, is the attempt to

evaluate the recent developments in Czechoslovakia's economy—the eviction of the German element and the reorientation of trade and production from the natural western to the enforced eastern outlets and connections. Miss Wanklyn, conscious of the shortness of the period and of the difficulty of obtaining dependably valid material, is extremely cautious in this evaluation, and wisely so, even if it might have been possible occasionally to go farther than she does in estimating the loss that Czechoslovakia's political fate has caused to her once healthily dynamic economy and to the standard of living of the majority of the Czech people, not only of the destroyed middle class. Taken all in all, this is a worthwhile contribution on an important subject.

FREDERICK G. HEYMANN

New School for Social Research

CARR, EDWARD HALLETT. *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923: A History of Soviet Russia*. Volume III. New York: Macmillan. 1953. ix & 614 pp. \$6.

GURIAN, WALDEMAR, editor. *Soviet Imperialism—Its Origins and Tactics: A Symposium*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 1953. vii & 166 pp. \$3.75.

This third volume of Carr's monumental history of Soviet Russia expounds the foreign policy of the communist regime up to the time when Lenin had to withdraw from the public scene. Throughout his life Carr has been primarily a student of international politics. It is therefore hardly surprising that the mastery he has hitherto displayed, in the volumes covering the domestic history of Soviet Russia in the initial period of her stormy existence (reviewed in this magazine in December 1952), is even surpassed in the present volume. The scope of the sources he has utilized is as impressive as the organization and presentation of that abundant and bewildering material.

As Carr himself has stated, he has intended "to write the history not of the events of the revolution . . . but of the political, social and economic order which emerged from it." In accordance with this general plan, his efforts in the present volume are concentrated on an attempt to sketch the emergence of the pattern of Soviet foreign policy. It would be strange, indeed, if Carr's personal conceptions of history and politics were not here and there traceable in the picture he draws. But the main lines of that picture are empirically determined rather than following preconceived ideas. Nor does Carr in any way try

to conceal or minimize the complexity and the inconsistency, potential or actual, of the pattern as it finally evolved.

For this reason his treatise, though purely historical, is at the same time a most valuable contribution to current discussions on the communist doctrine and practice of "coexistence." Carr's view on the respective roles of ideological and realistic considerations in the conduct of Soviet foreign policy can best be described in his own words: "... just as it would be mistaken," he says, "to suppose that the revolutionary element in Soviet policy was ever absent even when diplomacy appeared to have the upper hand, so it would be wrong to treat it, even in moments of greatest tension, as the exclusive factor."

Relevant as Carr's historical study is for the problems of the cold war, it shows no marks of the passions aroused by it. This can hardly be said about the symposium "Soviet Imperialism," edited by the late Professor Waldemar Gurian. The contributors to the volume—N. S. Timasheff, Michael Pap, Richard Pipes, W. Weintraub, Ling Nai-jui, and F. Barghoorn—were asked to address themselves to the momentous

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question of the nature of Soviet expansionism and its relation to Russian history. Is Soviet imperialism a communist phenomenon proper, or is it only another manifestation of permanent and indelible features inherent in the character of the Great Russian people and the Great Russian state?

The political implications of the answer to this question are as obvious as they are far-reaching. It is therefore not to be wondered at that the participants in the present symposium do not agree on either the answer to be given to the question or the political conclusions that should be drawn. Some of the contributions, especially those by Timasheff and Pipes, are valuable analyses of the problems involved in the question posed to them. Even Timasheff's essay, however, comes dangerously close to being a kind of legal brief. To be sure, he is right in rejecting the identification of Russianism and communism. All the same, he displays, in this reviewer's opinion, a tendency to oversimplify some of the issues related to the question under discussion.

ERICH HULA

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
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